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ABSTRACT 
 
That’s Immoral (Unless It’s Happening to an Outgroup Member): Moral Foundations, 
Political Identity, and Reactions to News Media 
 
by 
 
Ethan Hutson Hartsell 
 
Moral foundations theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013) proposes that moral judgments 
are intuitions that developed over the course of human evolutionary history, largely falling 
along five discrete foundations: authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and purity. MFT has been 
applied to media research by the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which 
delineates how innate moral intuitions guide selection and evaluation of media content 
(Tamborini, 2011). However, neither MFT nor MIME delineate the role of group 
membership in moral judgments, despite research on social identity theory suggesting hostile 
outgroup members fall outside the boundaries of moral judgment (e.g., Deutsch, 2006; 
Haslam, 2006). The present research examines MFT in the context of moral violations 
between Democrats and Republicans. A quasi-experiment was performed using a volunteer 
sample recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of five news stories depicting moral violations in Congress: a Democrat attacking the 
authority of a higher-ranking Democrat, a Democrat attacking the authority of a higher-
ranking Republican, and Republican attacking the authority of a higher-ranking Democrat, a 
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Republican attacking the authority of a higher-ranking Republican, or a neutral condition in 
which the political party of the two politicians was not specified. While MFT suggests that 
the type of moral violation (i.e., whether it is an authority, loyalty, care, fairness, or purity 
violation) should determine participants’ reaction to the moral violation, results largely 
corroborate a social identity perspective. Participants were not critical of ingroup members 
who committed authority violations against outgroup members, even when the participant 
reported caring heavily about authority violations generally. Additionally, participants were 
highly critical of outgroup members who committed authority violations against ingroup 
members, even when the participant reported not caring heavily about authority violations 
generally. Moreover, even though participants only saw news stories depicting violations of 
the authority and loyalty foundations, results showed significant differences in ratings of a 
moral transgressor’s care, fairness, and purity based on their status as an ingroup or outgroup 
member. Results suggest that group identity plays an important role in evaluating moral 
violations, often trumping individuals’ innate weightings of the five moral foundations 
outlined by MFT.  
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Chapter 1: That’s Immoral (Unless it’s Happening to an Outgroup Member): Moral 
Foundations, Political Identity, and Reactions to News Media 
Moral judgments play an integral role in the selection and evaluation of media 
content. Research over the last several decades indicates that audience members judge the 
morality of characters in fictional narratives, people in the news media, as well as the 
appropriateness of punishments for moral violations; these judgments impact interest in and 
enjoyment of media narratives (e.g., Tamborini et al., 2010; Zillmann & Bryant, 1975). 
While much of the early research on the effect of moral judgment on media selection and 
evaluation was based on rationalist approaches to morality, which argue that judgments of 
right and wrong are made via effortful and conscious deliberation (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981; 
Zillmann, 2000), recent research relies on intuitionist approaches, which propose that 
judgments of right and wrong are made rapidly and subconsciously. One such approach is 
moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2001). 
According to Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), moral judgments are intuitions that 
developed as adaptations over the course of human evolutionary history. Characteristic of 
evolved psychological mechanisms, Haidt (2001) claims that these intuitions are governed by 
discrete cognitive modules that react to environmental inputs (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). The 
theory refers to five moral foundations (or “modules”; although the theory recognizes that 
there could be many more): care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity. Being adaptive 
responses, people typically invoke these moral principles automatically with little conscious 
deliberation. Like many adaptations, however, moral foundations are facultative responses to 
different kinds of environmental scenarios. As such, different people weight the domains 
differently.  
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Moral foundations theory has been applied to several areas of research, much of it 
examining the relationship among innate moral modules, attitudes, emotions, and political 
ideology. For example, Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, and Haidt (2012) examined how 
weights of the five moral foundations could predict disapproval of hot-button political issues 
like abortion, same-sex marriage, and burning of the U.S. flag. They found that the 
sanctity/purity foundation was most associated with moral disapproval of these behaviors. 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, and Cohen (2009) examined how both trait and state disgust 
sensitivity affected perceptions of the importance of maintaining physical purity (e.g., 
washing hands, not getting tattoos, etc.) and spiritual purity (e.g., asking divine forgiveness 
for sins). Finally, a great deal of research has been done on moral foundations and political 
ideology. Haidt (2007) found that liberals and conservatives differ in the weights they place 
on the different moral foundations. Conservatives weight each of the five domains almost 
equally highly, and they are more sensitive to violations of the loyalty, authority, and purity 
domains than are liberals. Meanwhile, liberals are more sensitive to violations of the care and 
fairness domains than are conservatives.  
Research in the communication field has elaborated on the core principles of MFT to 
investigate how people react to mediated narratives. According to the model of intuitive 
morality and exemplars (MIME), which delineates how innate moral intuitions guide 
selection and evaluation of media (Tamborini, 2011), media contain exemplars that activate 
moral domains both positively and negatively. Audience members are attracted to narratives 
that depict violations of heavily-weighted moral domains and enjoy narratives that depict 
appropriate repercussions for moral violations. Research on MIME has examined how innate 
weightings of the five moral foundation impact audience members’ enjoyment of narratives 
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(e.g., Lewis, Tamborini, &Weber, 2014) as well as how repeated exposure to certain types of 
moral violations can change how much audience members weight each moral foundation 
(e.g., Eden et al., 2014).  
Given that both MFT and MIME are focused on morality, it is peculiar that neither 
theory gives adequate weight to a key feature of social life that strongly impacts moral 
judgment and behavior: Group membership. Graham et al. (2012) posit that differences in 
moral weights across cultures (e.g., different weights of the purity foundation between the 
United States and fundamentalist Islamic states in the Middle East) often cause poor 
intergroup relations, resulting in violent conflict and the moral exclusion of outgroup 
members (i.e., a sense that outgroup members are undeserving of moral rights). They cite 
Kesebir and Pyszczynski (2011), who argue that because faith in the validity of one’s 
worldviews acts as a buffer against the fear of death, people feel anxious and antagonistic 
against outgroups who possess differing worldviews. However, Graham et al. (2012) ignore 
decades of research on the role of group identity in moral judgments. 
A great deal of research shows that prejudice and discrimination are directed at 
members of outgroups, and that those reactions become more hostile as a function of the 
degree of conflict between groups (see Tajfel, 1981, for example). In those cases where 
intergroup conflict is particularly acute, members of outgroups may even fall outside the 
boundaries of moral judgment. In these cases, moral violations against outgroup members 
might be ignored, and, in the most extreme cases, outgroup members can be perceived as less 
than human and undeserving of moral regard (Deutsch, 2006; Opotow, 2012; see also 
Haslam, 2006, for a review of research on dehumanization). In extreme cases, members of 
outgroups are viewed as deserving of extermination (Rummel, 1992). On the other hand, 
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while intergroup conflict produces discrimination against and moral disregard for outgroup 
members, ingroup members are more likely to receive fairness, trust, and generosity.  
Research on moral disregard for outgroup members is not incompatible with Graham 
et al.’s (2012) proposal that intergroup conflict is sometimes caused and/or exacerbated by 
knowledge of an outgroup’s differing moral concerns. However, research in the minimal 
group paradigm indicates that intergroup conflict and moral disregard occur absent 
knowledge of what an outgroup finds moral/immoral. The paradigm involves randomly 
dividing participants into groups and having them perform resource distribution tasks (e.g., 
dividing money between two people: an experimentally-determined ingroup vs. outgroup 
member). As Diehl (1990) discusses in a review of minimal group research, mere 
categorization into separate groups is sufficient to trigger punitive discrimination against 
outgroups and favoritism to ingroups. This occurs absent negative social interdependence, a 
history of conflict, self-interest, and even the ability to identify individuals with groups. 
Moreover, while people who participate in minimal group experiments frequently show 
“fair” responses (e.g., allocate equal quantities of money to ingroup and outgroup members), 
this strategy coexists with the maximum differentiation strategy: Participants prefer that the 
ingroup have more relative to the outgroup than both groups having equal resources, even if 
unequal distribution requires the ingroup to sacrifice some resources (e.g., participants prefer 
giving $15 to an ingroup member and $10 to an outgroup member over $20 to each). All of 
these allocation choices have moral significance, particularly for the harm/care and fairness 
dimensions, and all are at odds with the simple proposition that ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup punishment result from knowledge of the outgroup’s moral values. 
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There is also evidence that group membership affects the extremity of moral 
judgment, and that moral judgments vary in intensity with the salience of group identity. For 
example, research shows people judge a moral violation against a hostile outgroup member 
less harshly than they judge the same moral violation against an ingroup member (Bruneau, 
Dufour, & Saxe, 2012). Other research indicates that while people view unfair authority 
figures negatively in an interpersonal context, they can perceive authority figures that are 
unfair to outgroup members positively (Platow, Reid, & Andrew, 1998; Platow et al., 1997). 
Group identity may play a powerful role in influencing how people process moral violations.  
Thus, there are two contrasting (but not irreconcilable) perspectives about the nature 
of moral intuitions and how they function in intergroup contexts. Moral foundations theory 
proposes that moral judgments come from innate, relatively intractable weights given to five 
discrete moral foundations. Though culture plays a role in determining which social inputs 
trigger the perception of a violation, and though people may come to weight one foundation 
or another more heavily or lightly over the course of cognitive development, people are born 
with the predisposition to care about some types of moral violations more than others 
(Graham et al., 2012). In contrast, social identity theorists claim that moral judgment is 
governed by coalitional psychology, and thus social categorizations. Fairness, trust, 
cooperation and equitable social exchange are all much more likely to occur in intragroup or 
interpersonal social contexts than intergroup social contexts (Diehl, 1990). This suggests that 
social categorization and group identification may causally precede the detailed moral 
judgments that are captured in MFT. These competing perspectives could be tested (and 
perhaps integrated) through a simple experimental manipulation of the group identity of the 
actor and target in a moral violation. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine audience reactions to moral violations 
in a political news story. The political arena is a natural place to test both moral foundations 
theory and social identity theory: Research on moral foundations theory suggests robust 
differences in how liberals and conservatives make moral judgments, and people recognize 
social categories based on political identity. The present study offers novel contributions to 
research on moral foundations theory, MIME, and social identity theory. Though MFT 
acknowledges differences between liberals and conservatives in the relative weight of the 
moral foundations, research on MFT has not examined how the political identity of the actor 
and target in a moral violation impacts moral judgments. If political identity is relatively 
powerful in impacting moral judgments, it might suggest that social categorization and group 
identity causally precede moral judgments. However, if innate differences between liberals 
and conservatives in moral judgment hold fast even in the context of intergroup conflict, it 
would suggest the moral foundations play an integral role in determining group identity. 
Finally, to date, research on MIME has examined the role of moral foundations in reactions 
to moral violations in fictional narratives. MIME proposes that the same processes operate in 
evaluations of news media, but this has not been tested experimentally. The present study 
marks the first attempt to test MIME in a news context.  
First, I will summarize moral foundations theory, paying close attention to its 
theoretical underpinnings in evolutionary psychology and the findings describing differences 
between liberals and conservatives. Second, I will discuss MIME and the role of moral 
intuitions in the selection and processing of mediated narratives. Third, I will discuss 
research on social identity and moral exclusion of outgroup members. Fourth, I will attempt 
to integrate arguments from the MFT and SIT perspectives and make predictions about 
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audience reactions to moral violations in a political news intergroup context. Finally, I will 
present findings from a quasi-experiment. 
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Chapter 2: Moral Foundations Theory 
Morality has been defined in various ways in philosophy and psychology. Kohlberg 
(1981) defined it as judgments about right and wrong, limited to the area of justice. Turiel 
(1983) expanded the definition of the moral domain as “prescriptive judgments of justice, 
rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other” (p. 3). In moral 
foundations theory, Haidt (2008) defines morality in terms of its function (rather than its 
content) as “sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms 
that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 70).  
Moral foundations theory takes a nativist, pluralist, intuitionist approach to morality 
(Graham et al., 2013). Humans are born with a first draft of a moral mind; they intuitively 
find some behaviors morally right and other behaviors morally wrong, and make moral 
judgments without much thought or effort (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). It is believed that 
humans’ cognitive moral architecture was designed over the course of human history via 
natural and sexual selection (Haidt, 2001). People who reacted strongly and negatively to 
unfairness in economic exchange, for instance, enjoyed fitness benefits over individuals who 
did not (Haidt, 2007). Innate moral structures make it easy for people to learn emotional 
reactions to environmental inputs, but they do not represent a final draft of the moral mind 
(Graham et al., 2013). 
Innate cognitive structures are influenced by culture and experience to produce a final 
(but malleable) set of cognitive moral structures. A child in a traditional Hindu family may 
learn rigid rules for respecting authority figures, for example, while a child in a secular 
American family may learn to distrust authority (Graham et al., 2013). Both children easily 
learn rules for evaluating and behaving around authority figures, but these rules produce 
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different outputs. Innate foundations guide what people can learn in terms of moral 
judgment, while culture and experience guide what people do learn.   
The Moral Domains 
Haidt and Joseph (2008) propose that selection pressures designed at least five 
different moral evaluation modules, each of which guides moral judgments in a separate 
domain, and each of which can be distinguished as either “individualizing” or “binding.”  
While the individualizing foundations focus on preserving individual rights (e.g., the right to 
not be cheated in an economic exchange) the binding foundations focus on subverting one’s 
own self-interest in the interest of group harmony. The five foundations are care and fairness 
(the two individualizing foundations), and loyalty, authority, and purity (the group-focused or 
“binding” foundations). The care foundation was designed via selection pressures to care for 
vulnerable offspring. Graham et al. (2013) note that cues to vulnerability and suffering 
extend beyond one’s own offspring, and emotional reactions to the suffering of others (and 
those who caused the suffering) are likely easily triggered by observing media (e.g., news 
stories, cartoon characters) and real-world objects (e.g., animals, strangers).  
The fairness foundation was designed via selection pressures to detect cheaters in 
economic exchange. Individuals who could identify and avoid cheaters enjoyed survival and 
reproductive benefits over those who engaged with all economic partners equally because 
they were able to secure and maintain resources (e.g., food) more effectively (e.g., Trivers, 
1971). The original inputs for the fairness/reciprocity foundation were interpersonal 
experiences with exchange partners, but more recent research has found that triggers also 
extend to inanimate objects like vending machines and gossip about cheaters heard through 
third-parties (Graham et al., 2013).  
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The loyalty foundation was designed via intergroup competition pressures. 
Individuals whose psychology compelled them to form tight-knit, loyal coalitions stood a 
better chance of survival than individuals whose psychology compelled them to form loose-
knit, disloyal coalitions. Today, the loyalty foundation can be triggered by brands, sports 
team, religion, and a host of other group identity contexts (Graham et al., 2013). 
The authority foundation was designed via selection pressures for navigating social 
hierarchies. Individuals who were compelled psychologically to recognize and form bonds 
with high status members of their clan enjoyed fitness benefits that others did not. Graham et 
al. (2013) note that there is a great deal of cultural variation regarding moral behavior with 
regard to authority; some cultures (like social conservatives in the United States) promote 
strong respect for authority while others (like social liberals in the United States) promote 
questioning authority (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
The sanctity/purity foundation was designed via selection pressures surrounding 
pathogen avoidance. Some behaviors, like interacting with members of different clans and 
eating meat, exposed humans to disease risks, and the emotion of disgust may have evolved 
as a preventative measure against exposure to these risks. In the modern world, the 
sanctity/purity foundation plays a role in religious standards for food preparation, reactions to 
immigrants, feelings regarding disease-carrying animals like rats and cockroaches, and 
disgust toward non-heteronormative sexual acts (Graham et al., 2013). 
MFT and Political Ideology 
 Some of MFT’s most robust findings regard differences in the moral maps of liberals 
and conservatives. In a series of four studies examining the 1) relevance of each foundation, 
2) harshness of judgments to violations of each foundation, 3) the monetary threshold 
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necessary to personally violate a foundation, and 4) textual analysis of moral themes in 
political speeches, Graham et al. (2009) consistently found that while conservatives weight 
all five domains equally, liberals give the highest weight to the fairness and harm/care 
foundations. Additionally, conservatives give more weight to the loyalty, authority, and 
purity foundations than do liberals. Graham et al. (2011) and Graham, Nosek, and Haidt 
(2012) have corroborated these findings.  
 Moreover, Graham et al. (2012) found that liberals and conservatives tend to 
stereotype members of the opposing ideology according to these moral differences. In a 
survey of a random sample of adults in the U.S., respondents correctly identified which 
foundations were important to members of their own and the opposing political party. 
However, they exaggerated the importance of each foundation, and this exaggeration 
occurred regardless of whether they were rating ingroup or outgroup members. Liberals were 
especially inaccurate, underestimating how much conservatives consider fairness and care 
while overestimating how much other liberals consider fairness and care. 
 This research, in addition to research on the Big Five personality traits (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and disgust sensitivity (e.g., Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 
2012), suggests that liberals and conservatives may engage different cognitive schema for 
processing social information. Liberals tend to make moral judgments according to 
individual (versus group) needs, tend to score highly on openness to new experiences, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism, and tend to have dampened disgust sensitivity. 
Conservatives tend to make moral judgments according to group needs, tend to be closed to 
new experiences, conscientious, and extraverted, and tend to have high levels of disgust 
sensitivity. Additionally, liberals and conservatives perceive these differences when 
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evaluating both ingroup and outgroup members (Graham et al., 2012). Group-level 
differences (along partisan lines) in moral psychology could reveal interesting patterns in the 
selection and evaluation of media content. 
MFT and Media Content 
Recent research in partisan selective exposure suggests that liberals and conservatives 
consume news media differently. For example, research indicates conservatives are more 
likely to rely on Fox News, conservative blogs, and Christian news outlets than are liberals; 
liberals are more likely than Conservatives to rely on NPR, news satire programs, “Big 3” 
news outlets (ABC/NBC/CBS), liberal blogs, Twitter, and Facebook (Wicks, Wicks, & 
Marimoto, 2015). Other studies show that conservatives use Fox News more than liberals 
(Messing & Westwood, 2012; Stroud, 2010), liberals rely on MSNBC more than 
conservatives (Messing & Westwood, 2012), and liberals were significantly more likely to 
see the anti-George W. Bush documentary Fahrenheit 911 than were conservatives (Stroud, 
2007). Partisan differences in media choice extend to other countries, including China (Chan 
& Lee, 2014), Uruguay, Italy, Bulgaria, Spain, Japan, Chile, Greece, Hungary, and the 
United Kingdom (Goldman & Mutz, 2011). These media-selection patterns are likely due to 
several reasons (e.g., perceived source credibility, accessibility of information in social 
networks, social identity gratifications, etc.), one of which may be due to the differences in 
the morals emphasized in liberal and conservative news sources.  
In his model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which builds upon MFT, 
Tamborini (2011) argues that moral intuitions guide reactions to and selection of media 
content. MIME borrows from MFT in explaining that humans possess innate moral 
foundations that guide reactions to moral or immoral behavior. MIME also builds on research 
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by Zillmann (2000) and others in arguing that media contain moral exemplars: salient 
examples of moral valor and moral impropriety. Audience members make moral judgments 
about the people in fictional and news narratives; the strength of these judgments varies 
based on the salience of the exemplars in the narrative and the relative innate weight that 
audience members give to each of the core moral foundations (Tamborini, 2011). Although 
moral judgments are mostly made quickly and effortlessly, audience members might make 
effortful moral judgments when multiple, conflicting moral exemplars are present in a 
narrative. 
MIME further proposes that moral intuitions and exemplars in the media have short-
term as well as long-term relationships. In the short term, the theory argues that people will 
be attracted to media that highlight moral foundations they care the most about, react 
positively to narratives that confirm their moral beliefs, and react negatively to narratives that 
disconfirm their moral beliefs (Tamborini, 2011). The MIME predicts that these short-term 
experiences shape long-term expectations for media content and lead to patterns of repeated 
selective exposure. Additionally, individuals may weight moral modules more heavily as 
they are repeatedly triggered by media content (Tamborini, 2011). Finally, because many 
media outlets are financially motivated by drawing an audience, audience selective exposure 
patterns may impact the construction of media content (Mastro, Enriquez, Bowman, Prabhu, 
& Tamborini, 2013). An increase in attitude-reinforcing media content could exacerbate a 
cycle of exposure and reinforcement. 
MIME and Media Enjoyment. Research suggests that moral foundations impact 
audience members’ enjoyment of narratives. A within subjects experiment by Tamborini et 
al. (2013) showed participants ten short summaries of fake films. The summaries varied in 
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terms which of the five moral foundations was violated (two for each foundation, with only 
one foundation being violated in each summary), as well as the narrative outcome 
(punishment or reward for the moral violator). They found that individual differences in 
individuals’ weights of the moral foundations predicted their ratings of the violator’s moral 
character: the more a participant cared about the moral foundation, the lower they rated the 
character of the moral violator. They also found that moral domain salience predicted the 
appeal of the narrative: even when moral violators were rewarded for their behavior, 
participants who heavily weighted the moral foundation found the narrative more appealing 
than those who did not.  
A similar study by Lewis, Tamborini, and Weber (2014) varied whether the ending of 
a hypothetical film upheld all five moral foundations, violated all five moral foundations, or 
upheld some moral foundations while violating others.  The study revealed that audience 
members experienced more cognitive conflict, took longer to appraise narrative appeal, and 
were less likely to enjoy a narrative when the resolution was morally ambiguous (i.e., 
violated one moral violation to uphold another) or conflicted with their own moral 
foundations than when the resolution upheld all of their moral foundations. Interestingly, 
audience members in the same study demonstrated near-equal levels of appreciation for 
ambiguous and all-positive moral resolutions to narratives, while experiencing less 
appreciation for moral conclusions that conflicted with their own moral foundations 
(researchers defined “appreciation” as how meaningful, moving, and thought-provoking a 
narrative was).  
Tamborini, Eden, Bowman, Grizzard, and Lachlan (2012) found that salience of the 
care foundation impacted audience members’ ratings of the graphicness and enjoyableness of 
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violence in a narrative. They showed participants summaries from fake films, varying how 
graphic the violence was in the film as well as whether or not the violence was justified. 
Participants who weighted the care foundation heavily rated the descriptions as more graphic 
than those who did not. Additionally, innate weight of the fairness foundation predicted 
appeal of the narrative in which the violence was justified: Participants who cared deeply 
about fairness found justified violence more appealing than those who did not. 
MIME research also indicates that there is a relationship between exposure to certain 
types of moral appeals and the innate weight audience members give to each moral 
foundation. In a longitudinal experiment by Eden et al. (2014), participants watched an 
online soap opera for eight weeks and were measured on the domain weight of each of the 
five moral foundations before and after the 8-week period. The foundations of care, fairness, 
and purity were salient in the soap opera narrative. Compared to a control group, soap opera 
viewers reported caring more about those three foundations after viewing the soap opera for 
8 weeks. A similar study by Tamborini et al. (2010) found that a televised soap opera 
reinforced moral judgments over time, though this study did not test the specific five moral 
domains of MFT.    
Though MIME (Tamborini, 2011) proposes that moral intuitions guide audience 
reactions to news media, all of the research to date has focused on fictional narratives. In 
light of MFT research showing that conservatives and liberals differ in how they weight the 
moral foundations (Graham et al. 2009), and selective exposure research demonstrating that 
conservatives and liberals differ in their preference for certain news sources (e.g., Stroud, 
2010), an application of MIME to news media represents a step forward for the model. 
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Additionally, MFT and MIME can contribute theoretically to research on partisan 
differences in media consumption. Much of the research focuses on cognitive dissonance as a 
motivating mechanism for partisan selective exposure: people want to avoid the cognitive 
dissonance brought on by exposure to counter-attitudinal information (Festinger, 1957; 
Garrett, 2009a, 2009b; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). 
However, cognitive dissonance is difficult to measure, and the theory lacks a theoretical 
explanation of why discomfort at the inconsistency between beliefs, attitudes, and actions 
would occur in the first place. In contrast, MFT and MIME can generate concrete, testable 
hypotheses about differences in how liberals and conservatives process information rooted in 
evolutionary psychology.  
Hypotheses derived from MFT and MIME. Research on MFT shows that 
conservatives weight the loyalty, authority, and purity foundations higher than liberals, while 
liberals weight the care and fairness foundations higher than conservatives. The first 
hypothesis seeks to replicate these past findings: 
H1: Republicans will weight the loyalty, authority, and purity foundations higher 
than Democrats; Democrats will weight the care and fairness foundations higher than 
Republicans.  
Moreover, MIME argues that audience members react negatively to narratives 
depicting violations of heavily-weighted foundations, especially when these violations go 
unpunished in narrative resolutions. These negative reactions exist in terms of ratings of 
characters’ morality and in terms of evaluations of enjoyment and appreciation of a narrative 
(Eden et al., 2014; Lewis et al., 2014; Tamborini et al., 2012; Tamborini et al., 2013). News 
stories about conflict in politics offer an excellent opportunity to examine audience reactions 
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to moral violations, especially regarding authority and loyalty. In Congress, for instance, 
there are easily identifiable indicators of rank (e.g., Senate Majority Leader vs. Junior 
Senator) and group affiliation (e.g., Republican vs. Democrat). As an added benefit, 
conservatives and liberals weight the authority and loyalty foundations differently, yielding 
clear predictions about differences in how each group will process violations of those 
respective foundations in a news story:  
H2: After reading a news story depicting an authority violation, Republicans will a) 
rate a moral transgressor significantly lower on an authority scale, b) exhibit more 
anger at the moral transgressor’s actions, c) exhibit less support of the moral 
transgressor’s actions, d) find the news story more interesting, and e) find the news 
story less entertaining than will Democrats. 
H3: After reading a news story depicting a loyalty violation, Republicans will a) rate 
a moral transgressor significantly lower on a loyalty scale, b) exhibit more anger at 
the moral transgressor’s actions, c) exhibit less support of the moral transgressor’s 
actions, d) find the news story more interesting, and e) find the news story less 
entertaining than will Democrats. 
  
 
 
18 
Chapter 3: Morality and Intergroup Relations 
Moral foundations theory and MIME take the position that the weight individuals 
give to each moral foundation is innate but not intractable; contextual factors can influence 
people’s perceptions of moral violations (Graham et al., 2012; Tamborini, 2011). For 
example, in a context when individuals are presented with moral conundrums (situations in 
which a behavior upholds one moral value while violating another, like stealing bread to feed 
a hungry child), they are likely to be more effortful in their appraisals of the violation than 
when presented with a moral violation that does not uphold another moral value, like stealing 
bread from a hungry child (Tamborini, 2011). One factor that influences moral judgments is 
group identity. The following sections first discuss how moral foundations researchers have 
examined the interaction of morality and intergroup relations, they then address gaps in the 
MFT literature by discussing research in social identity theory, moral boundaries, and 
leadership endorsement.  
Moral Foundations and Intergroup Relations 
 Moral foundations theory divides foundations into individualizing (care, fairness) and 
binding (authority, loyalty, and purity) foundations (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 
2007). As discussed earlier, the individualizing foundations focus on preserving individual 
rights, and the binding foundations focus on subverting one’s own interest in the interest of 
the group. Authority encourages people to recognize and respect social hierarchies. Loyalty 
encourages faithfulness to group obligations as well as wariness toward outgroups. Purity 
encourages active displays of loyalty via adherence to group rituals while also discouraging 
exposure to potential pathogens that could put the entire group at risk of illness (Graham et 
al., 2013; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).  
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The binding moral foundations were likely selected by intergroup conflict. According 
to the evolutionary psychology perspective, as different clans competed over resources in the 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (Pleistocene era, which lasted from roughly 2.5 
million to roughly 11,700 years ago), individuals who showed fierce clan loyalty and 
respected social hierarchies enjoyed fitness benefits over individuals in loosely-knit clans 
(Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). The binding foundations (especially purity) also serve 
a pathogen-avoidance function; they discourage people from interacting with strangers who 
may carry disease (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Put simply, the binding foundations 
guide how humans interact with members of outgroups.  
As discussed earlier, Haidt and colleagues propose that knowledge of an outgroup’s 
divergent moral beliefs is existentially threatening and leads to group conflict (e.g., Graham 
et al., 2013). However, there is very little research that examines MFT in an intergroup 
context. Ditto and Koleva (2011) argue that the American political “culture war” between 
Republicans and Democrats over issues like abortion, gay marriage, and gun control may be 
due to differences in how liberals and conservatives make moral judgments. For example, 
liberals may not perceive violations of authority, loyalty, and/or purity as immoral at all, and 
may reject conservative moral concerns about these foundations out of hand. This account is 
corroborated by Graham, Nosek, and Haidt (2012), who found that liberals and conservatives 
tend to have exaggerated, stereotypical views about the weights that the opposing group 
assigns to the five foundations. 
Intergroup relationships also affect moral judgments outside of the political domain. 
Smith, Aquino, Koleva, and Graham (2014) examined how reliance on the binding 
foundations predicted support for torture of a threatening outgroup member (i.e., a terrorist) 
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and found that while the binding foundations are associated with less regard for outgroup 
members, low regard is mitigated by the strength of moral identity. Moral identity was 
defined as a “schema of the moral self that is composed of an associated network of moral 
traits, scripts, and values” (Smith et al., 2014, p. 1556) and was measured on a 10-item scale 
as the degree to which people wanted to be perceived as having 9 positive traits, including 
compassion, fairness, and generosity.  Bruneau at al. (2012) examined the moral foundations 
of Arabs, Israelis, and South Americans and compared their reactions to 12 short narratives 
when the protagonist was from an ingroup, distant outgroup, and hostile outgroup; 
participants reported significantly more compassion for ingroup protagonists and non-hostile 
outgroup protagonists than they showed for hostile outgroup protagonists.  
The research by Bruneau et al. (2012) also demonstrates that people can deviate from 
their innate moral foundations when judging outgroup members. For example, many Israelis 
who heavily weight the harm/care foundation are blind to the suffering of an Arab, and vice 
versa (Bruneau et al., 2012). However, it is unclear how powerful intergroup relationships 
are in influencing moral judgments; if they are tremendously powerful, it might undermine 
the MFT proposal that humans possess innate, strong foundations that guide intuitive moral 
judgments. It could also provide a major proviso to the theory: people do differ in innate 
foundation weights, but the moral foundations only work in particular contexts, after 
information about group status is accounted for. Moreover, while moral foundations theory 
acknowledges the role of culture in shaping the moral foundations (Graham et al., 2013), it 
does not explicate a mechanism for large and frequent deviations from baseline foundation 
weights. Research on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), optimal distinctiveness 
theory (Brewer, 1991; 2003), and moral boundaries (Opotow, 1990) can address this gap. 
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Moral Boundaries, SIT, and Optimal Distinctiveness  
   Moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2013) takes the position that group identity 
plays a small role in moral judgments, rather for the most part, individuals rely on innate, 
fairly rigid, identifiable moral maps. Other perspectives argue that group identity plays a 
central, antecedent role in moral judgments: humans intuitively and rapidly identify whether 
someone is an ingroup or outgroup member, compare the social status between the ingroup 
and outgroup, assess whether the outgroup is a threat, and use these assessments to guide 
moral judgments.  
In her research on moral boundaries, Opotow (1990a) demonstrates that humans have 
a mental scope of justice, defined as a boundary separating individuals and groups that 
deserve moral concern from those that do not. Outgroups often fall outside the scope of 
justice; they are perceived as undeserving of fair treatment, access to community resources, 
and sacrifice on the part of others (Opotow, 1990a). They are often dehumanized, referred to 
in terms that elicit pathogen fears (e.g., “vermin,” “virus,” “disease,” “rats,” “cockroaches,” 
etc.) (Opotow, 1990b). In extreme cases, groups that fall outside the scope of justice of an 
existing administration experience systematic oppression, exclusion from the political 
process, and genocide (Opotow, 2012).   
Moral boundaries are rooted in social identity. According to social identity theory 
(e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), humans categorize themselves and others into discrete groups 
and make social comparisons among these groups. Part of an individual’s self-concept is 
comprised of knowledge of memberships in these social groups (Tajfel, 1981).  Because the 
self-concept is comprised of group memberships, individuals are motivated to maintain 
positive distinctiveness: they want their ingroups to possess status advantages over 
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outgroups—to be different from yet better than outgroups. Positive distinctiveness is 
achieved via three strategies: social mobility, social creativity, and social competition. 
How people choose to pursue positive distinctiveness depends on the nature of the 
relationship between the ingroup and outgroup: how stable it is, the legitimacy of the status 
difference, and the permeability of group boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People are 
likely to use mobility strategies to create positive distinctiveness when ingroup status is low, 
identification with the ingroup is low, and group boundaries are perceived as stable and 
legitimate. Specifically, individuals might disassociate from the ingroup and pursue self-
interest. People are likely to use social creativity strategies to pursue positive distinctiveness 
when identification with the ingroup is high, group boundaries are perceived as rigid, and the 
relationship between ingroup and outgroup is stable—i.e., the intergroup situation cannot be 
easily changed. For example, people might look for new dimensions on which to compare the 
ingroup and outgroup that are more favorable for the ingroup. People are likely to use social 
competition strategies when identification with the ingroup is high, group boundaries are 
perceived as rigid, and the relationship between ingroup and outgroup is unstable. 
Specifically, people might display ingroup favoritism (giving preferential treatment to 
ingroup members) and outgroup denigration (denying outgroup members social benefits held 
by the ingroup) if that protects a high status ingroup position, or enables a low status group to 
pursue greater status at the expense of rival outgroups. 
Importantly, ingroup favoritism does not always equate to outgroup denigration. 
People can show strong support for an ingroup while feeling positive or neutral about 
outgroups. Optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) expands on SIT by using 
evolutionary psychology to explicitly delineate circumstances under which people use social 
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competition strategies involving outgroup denigration. One of the evolutionary functions of 
groups is efficient acquisition and distribution of resources (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). 
Outgroup hate and ingroup love are likely to occur when groups are competing over the same 
scarce resources (acquisition) and when groups are in struggles for political power 
(distribution of resources) (Brewer, 2007). Because political power deals with building 
justice systems (determining which behaviors are immoral, determining who deserves 
retribution when morally wronged, determining appropriate punishments for moral 
violations, and distributing resources fairly), outgroup hate is often exacerbated by feelings 
of ingroup moral superiority (Brewer, 2007). Thus, under circumstances where an outgroup 
constitutes competition for scarce resources and political power, that outgroup is likely to fall 
outside of moral boundaries. As such, the moral foundations explained by Haidt and 
colleagues may not operate as predicted when making moral judgments about outgroup 
members, particularly if those outgroup member are a threat to the ingroup. 
Social identity and leadership endorsement. The social identity approach also has 
important implications for the specific moral foundation of authority. The authority 
foundation assumes that individuals recognize an authority figure’s power as legitimate. 
Social identity plays a role in assessing the legitimacy of an authority figure. Under 
circumstances when ingroup commitment is high, leaders who exhibit prototypical ingroup 
traits are evaluated more favorably than those who do not exhibit these traits (Fielding & 
Hogg, 1997; Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997). Additionally, though people prefer fair leaders in 
intragroup contexts, they prefer leaders who unfairly favor ingroup members in competitive 
intergroup contexts (Platow, Reid, & Andrew, 1998; Platow & van Knippenburg, 1997). 
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Even people who heavily weight the authority foundation may not view subversion as 
immoral if the authority figure is an outgroup member.     
 Social identity and media. MIME explains the process of selective exposure to 
media content in terms of morality salience. As Tamborini (2011) explains, people are 
attracted to narratives that trigger their moral foundations and experience positive emotions 
when moral conflicts are resolved in ways that are consistent with their innate morality. 
Research on MIME also suggests that people appreciate narratives with moral complexity 
(i.e., uphold some foundations while violating others) (Lewis et al, 2014). Selective exposure 
to media content occurs because people learn which media sources and narrative types 
portray the right moral narratives to elicit positive emotions. In contrast, social identity 
theory would explain some of the selective exposure phenomenon in terms of the desire for 
positive distinctiveness, made possible through identification with characters and/or 
coalitions depicted in media. Individuals are motivated to select media content by self-
enhancement, part of which can be achieved through social comparisons between ingroups 
and outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Media can satisfy needs for self-enhancement by 
presenting ingroups in favorable ways. Selective exposure can thus result from seeking out 
positive information about ingroups and avoiding negative information about ingroups 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010).  
 Research supports the notion that media can impact self-enhancement through 
portrayals of ingroups and outgroups. Research on race (Mastro, Behm-Morawitz, & Kopacz, 
2008; Mastro & Tukachinsky, 2011; Melican & Dixon, 2008; Rivadeneyra, Ward, & 
Gordon, 2007), gender (Behm-Morawitz & Mastro, 2008; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 
2006), and age (Harwood, 1999) suggest that negative portrayals of ingroup members tend to 
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lower self-esteem, and that people tend to avoid media containing these portrayals. 
Moreover, people tend to experience higher self-esteem when exposed to media that 
positively portray ingroups and negatively portray outgroups (Harwood, 1999; Knobloch-
Westerwick & Hastall, 2006; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010; Rivadeneyra et al., 
2007; Ward, 2004). The same process occurs in depictions of political ingroups and 
outgroups. Positive portrayals of political ingroups predict positive self-concept, as well as 
likelihood/duration of exposure to news media (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2008). 
Positive portrayals of ingroups also predict ratings of how interesting and informative a news 
article is (Coe et al., 2008). Put simply, group identity impacts evaluations and effects of 
media content. 
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Chapter 4: Rationale and Hypotheses 
 As discussed, moral foundations theory presents compelling evidence that moral 
judgments stem from innate weights assigned to sets of discrete moral foundations (Graham 
et al., 2013). Further, research in MFT has shown that conservatives and liberals assign 
different weights to each foundation. Conservatives rely on all five foundations nearly 
equally, but rely on authority, ingroup/betrayal, and purity more than liberals. In contrast, 
liberals rely on fairness and care more than conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2012). 
Based on these innate differences between liberals and conservatives, MIME would predict 
that in a media context in which group identity is not salient, conservatives will judge a 
person who subverts authority more harshly than liberals, and conservatives will be more 
interested in a news story depicting this violation. However, MFT does not explain how 
moral foundations and group identity interact to produce moral judgments.  
Research on moral boundaries, social identity theory, optimal distinctiveness theory, 
and leadership endorsement suggest that intergroup relationships will powerfully impact 
moral judgments in a political context. Political outgroups present competition for scarce 
resources and political power, and political outgroups are often viewed as morally inferior to 
ingroups (Brewer, 2007). Though political outgroups may not fall entirely outside of moral 
boundaries, they very likely receive less moral regard than political ingroups. In fact, the 
effect of intergroup relationships on moral judgments might be so strong that typical liberal 
and conservative moral foundation weight patterns are reversed; conservatives could be 
induced to ignore authority and ingroup/betrayal violations, and liberals could be induced to 
care deeply about authority and loyalty violations. Testing the interaction will advance 
research in both MFT and SIT; it will demonstrate the degree of intractability in moral 
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foundations as well as the level of influence of intergroup relationships in guiding moral 
judgments. 
Assumptions based on MFT, MIME, and Moral Boundaries 
 Moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2013) does not specify how intergroup 
relationships interact with innate moral foundations when forming moral judgments. For 
example, the theory is silent on whether moral violations against an outgroup member will be 
judged the same as moral violations against an ingroup member. However, some assumptions 
can be made based on the evolutionary logic discussed to substantiate the theory, MFT 
research, and research on moral boundaries. Only by making five assumptions will it be 
possible to generate predictions using MFT in an intergroup context. 
 First, there is consistent evidence that conservatives weight authority and loyalty 
violations more heavily than liberals. Additionally, conservatives care equally about 
authority and loyalty violations. According to Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009), 
conservatives weight both foundations around 3 points on a 5-point Likert scale, with 5 being 
the high point. Liberals also weight authority and loyalty violations equally to each other, 
just at a lower level than conservatives (around 2 points on a 5-point Likert scale; Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  
 Second, when multiple foundations are violated simultaneously, there will be an 
additive effect on the severity of the moral judgment: both liberals and conservatives should 
judge the violator more harshly than when a single foundation is violated. This assumption 
hinges on two pieces of logic: First, Tamborini (2011) and Graham et al. (2013) propose that 
individuals evaluate moral violators based on the individual weights they assign to each 
moral foundation. Second, Lewis, Tamborini, and Weber (2104) demonstrated that the 
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number of foundations being upheld vs. violated matters in audience assessments of 
narratives. The violation of one moral foundation to support another (e.g., stealing a piece of 
bread to feed a hungry child) leads to more effortful appraisal by the moral judge, while the 
violation of multiple moral foundations without upholding another (e.g., stealing a piece of 
bread from a hungry child) increases negative reactions to the moral violator. 
 Third, authority and loyalty violations that occur in an ingroup should be judged more 
harshly than authority and loyalty violations that occur in an outgroup; evolutionarily, it is 
imperative to have cohesive groups, and both authority and loyalty violations hurt group 
cohesion (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Moreover, as Brewer (2007) and others demonstrate, 
violations against outgroup members are often disregarded or perceived as justified. This 
assumption is consistent with the argument put forth by MFT researchers that the authority 
and loyalty foundations are binding foundations rooted in governing ingroup social 
hierarchies and intergroup relations (Graham et al., 2013). 
 Fourth, moral violations that occur against an outgroup can be viewed positively. 
Bruneau at al. (2012) demonstrated in their examination of moral violations against distant 
versus threatening outgroups, moral violations that favor the ingroup (e.g., an ingroup 
member undermining the authority of an outgroup member) can be viewed neutrally (in the 
case of a distant outgroup) or positively (in the case of a hostile outgroup); such violations 
can help ingroup security (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). 
 Fifth, when a positive moral violation occurs, it can cancel out the negative judgment 
of a concurrent negative moral violation. For example, if an ingroup-favoring authority 
violation occurs with a loyalty violation (e.g., if a Republican sees a low-ranking Democrat 
attack a high-ranking Democrat), the violations can cancel each other out. MFT (Haidt, 2008) 
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and MIME (2011) both recognize that situations in which multiple foundations are violated 
lead to greater effort in forming moral judgments, and Lewis, Tamborini, and Weber (2014) 
showed that audience members rated narratives depicting the violation of one moral 
foundation to uphold another moral foundation as equally appealing as narratives in which all 
moral foundations were upheld.  
Moral Judgment Rationales 
 These assumptions make it possible to hypothesize about how people will judge the 
morality of a moral transgressor in a variety of group contexts. As discussed earlier, political 
conflicts often provide clear examples of moral violations within and between distinct, easily 
identifiable groups. In the U.S. government, politicians mostly belong to two political parties 
(Republican and Democrat), making it easy to identify loyalty violations. Additionally, there 
is a clear power hierarchy in government. Within the Senate, for example, the Senate 
Majority Leader ranks higher than a Junior Senator. Thus, it is possible to identify violations 
of the authority foundation. 
Ingroup against ingroup authority violation. In this scenario, a Democrat sees a 
Democrat politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking Democrat politician; a 
Republican sees a Republican politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking 
Republican politician. In this case, loyalty (ingroup-on-ingroup vioation) and authority 
(lower ranking against higher ranking) violations occur simultaneously. Using the additive 
logic from Tamborini (2011) and Graham et al. (2013), if loyalty and authority violations 
occur simultaneously, the moral transgressor should be rated lower on both foundations that 
in a situation where either a loyalty violation or an authority violation occurs. This should be 
true of both Democrat and Republican participants. However, as specified in Hypotheses 2 
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and 3, the effect should be stronger among Republicans, because Republicans weight 
authority and loyalty violations more heavily than Democrats (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009).   
 Outgroup against ingroup authority violation. In this scenario, a Democrat sees a 
Republican politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking Democrat politician; a 
Republican sees a Democrat politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking 
Republican politician. In this case there is only an authority violation; there is no violation of 
the loyalty foundation.  Both Democrats and Republicans should rate an outgroup member 
low on respect for authority (i.e., low on an authority scale) when seeing them undermine the 
authority of a high status ingroup member. However, based on the additive logic from 
Tamborini (2011) and Graham et al. (2013), when a liberal sees a low-ranking Republican 
subvert the authority of a high-ranking Democrat, the moral transgressor should be rated 
higher on respect for authority than when a liberal sees a low-ranking Republican subvert the 
authority of a high-ranking Republican. In the former instance, only one foundation 
(authority) is being violated, so it should be judged less harshly than when two foundations 
(authority and loyalty) are violated. Again, Republicans should judge the outgroup-on-
ingroup authority violation more harshly than Democrats.  
 While Democrats and Republicans should rate an outgroup-on-ingroup violation 
lower on authority, there should be no effect for perceptions of the attacker’s loyalty to the 
ingroup; the attack is on an outgroup member, so no loyalty violation occurs. 
 Outgroup against outgroup authority violation. In this scenario, a Democrat sees a 
Republican politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking Republican politician; a 
Republican sees a Democrat politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking Democrat 
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politician. Thus, loyalty and authority violations occur simultaneously. Research by Bruneau 
et al. (2012) showed that moral violations against an outgroup member can be viewed 
positively. MFT (Haidt, 2008) also proposes that ingroup-favoring moral violations can be 
viewed positively. Thus, Democrats and Republicans who see an outgroup member 
undermine the authority of another outgroup member should rate the moral transgressor 
higher on respect for authority than those who see an outgroup-on-ingroup or an ingroup-on-
ingroup violation; an outgroup-on-outgroup violation favors the ingroup, whereas outgroup-
on-ingroup and ingroup-on-ingroup violations do not. Republicans should rate the moral 
transgressor lower on authority than Democrats.  
A similar effect should occur for ratings of the moral transgressor’s loyalty. An 
outgroup-on-outgroup attack is good for the ingroup, so ratings of the attacker’s loyalty to 
the attacker’s own ingroup should be higher in the outgroup-on-outgroup condition than in 
the ingroup-on-ingroup condition. Again, because Republicans weight the loyalty foundation 
more heavily than Democrats, Republicans should rate the attacker lower on loyalty than 
Democrats.  
 Ingroup against outgroup authority violation. In this scenario, a Democrat sees a 
Democrat politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking Republican politician; a 
Republican sees a Republican politician undermine the authority of a higher-ranking 
Democrat politician. Thus, only an authority violation occurs; there is no loyalty violation. 
Both Democrats and Republicans should view an ingroup-on-outgroup authority violation 
positively. Research by Fielding and Hogg (1997) suggests that people often do not 
recognize the authority of outgroup members as legitimate, and undermining the authority of 
outgroup members represents a status gain for the ingroup. Thus, a moral transgressor who 
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commits an ingroup-on-outgroup authority violation should be rated higher on authority than 
in the previous three conditions. Moreover, both Republicans and Democrats should rate an 
ingroup member attacking an outgroup member higher on loyalty than moral transgressors in 
the other three conditions. This boost should be higher among Republicans, who weight the 
loyalty foundation more heavily than Democrats.  
 Group-identity neutral authority violation. Absent of cues to group identities, 
Republicans should rate a low-ranking politician who commits an authority violation against 
a high-ranking politician lower on authority than should Democrats. Because no loyalty 
violation occurs, there should be no difference between Democrats and Republicans on 
ratings of the moral transgressor’s loyalty.  
Hypotheses 
 As discussed previously, research on MIME (Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014; 
Tamborini, 2011) and MFT (Graham et al., 2013) suggests that when multiple moral 
foundations are violated, there is an additive effect on observers’ judgments of the moral 
transgressor, such that the transgressor is judged more harshly than if they had only violated 
one foundation. Additionally, insofar as the authority and loyalty foundations evolved to 
promote group cohesion, moral violations that favor an ingroup against a competitive 
outgroup can be viewed positively, while violations that threaten group cohesion should be 
viewed negatively (Haidt, 2008). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 H4: Participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s respect for authority will move 
from lowest to highest in the following pattern (where low means violation of the 
authority foundation and high represents adherence to the foundation): lowest for a 
news story in which there is an ingroup-on-ingroup authority violation, followed by, 
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in order, a news story in which there is an outgroup-on-ingroup authority violation, a 
news story in which there is an outgroup-on-outgroup authority violation, a news 
story in which there is a party-neutral authority violation, and highest for a news story 
in which there is an ingroup-on-outgroup authority violation.  
Similar logic can yield predictions about perceptions of a moral transgressor’s 
ingroup loyalty. When a loyalty violation occurs simultaneously with an authority violation, 
it should be judged more harshly when the violations undermine ingroup cohesion than when 
the violations undermine the cohesion of a competitive outgroup. Moreover, if an authority 
violation favors an ingroup, it can be viewed positively. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is advanced: 
H5: Participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s loyalty will move from lowest to 
highest in the following pattern: lowest for a news story in which there is an ingroup-
on-ingroup violation, followed by, in order, a news story in which there is an 
outgroup-on-outgroup violation, a news story in which there is a party-neutral 
violation, a news story in which there is an outgroup-on-ingroup violation, and 
highest for a news story in which there is an ingroup-on-outgroup loyalty violation. 
While MFT and MIME lead to straight-forward predictions about perceptions of a 
moral transgressor when it is clear which foundations are being violated, it is less clear how 
the violation of one foundation (e.g., authority) influences perceptions of a separate, but 
unviolated, foundation (e.g., purity). Thus, the following research question will be explored: 
RQ1: Will the type of conflict (ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-
on-ingroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, or party-neutral) in a news story depicting an 
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authority violation impact participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s care, 
fairness, and purity and, if so, how?  
MIME (Tamborini, 2011) proposes that there is a direct relationship between 
perceptions of moral violations and interest in narratives. A narrative that features multiple 
violations (e.g., an authority violation and a loyalty violation) should be more interesting 
than a narrative that features only one kind of violation (e.g., an authority violation or a 
loyalty violation). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H6: Participants’ ratings of interest in a news story will move from highest to lowest 
in the following pattern: highest for a news story in which there is an ingroup-on-
ingroup violation, followed by, in order, a news story in which there is an outgroup-
on-outgroup violation, a news story in which there is an outgroup-on-ingroup 
violation, a news story in which there is an ingroup-on-outgroup authority violation, 
and lowest for a news story in which there is a party-neutral violation.   
 Finally, research indicates that there is an important distinction between interest in 
and enjoyment of narratives (Lewis et al., 2014). People tend to enjoy narratives that concord 
with their moral expectations (e.g., moral exemplars are rewarded and moral transgressors 
are punished). The social identity perspective would add that identity affirmation plays an 
equally important role in media enjoyment. Narratives in which ingroup members are 
portrayed positively (and outgroup members are portrayed negatively) are more enjoyable 
than the opposite. Because individuals tend to enjoy media in which ingroup members are 
portrayed positively and outgroup members are portrayed negatively more than media in 
which ingroup members are portrayed negatively and outgroup members are portrayed 
positively, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
 
35 
H7: Participants will most be most entertained by a news story in which an ingroup 
member undermines the authority of an outgroup member, followed by, in order, a 
news story in which an outgroup member undermines the authority of an outgroup 
member, a news story in which an outgroup member undermines the authority of an 
ingroup member, and a news story in which an ingroup member undermines the 
authority of an ingroup member.  
Chapter 4: Methods 
Participants and Design 
  Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid 
$1.00 for their participation, and the study lasted approximately 30 minutes. The study 
employed a 3(participants’ political identification: Democrat, Moderate, or Conservative) x 5 
(moral violation type: Democrat on Democrat, Democrat on Republican, Republican on 
Republican, Republican on Democrat, or unidentified on unidentified) between-subjects 
experimental design. Participants were later coded as seeing an in-group on in-group 
violation, in-group on out-group violation, out-group on in-group violation, out-group on out-
group violation, and politically neutral violation (see the following paragraph for a complete 
description).  
In order to accommodate individuals who identified equally strongly with both 
political parties, and to categorize participants, political identification was assessed using 
separate 7-point Likert-type items measuring identification with the Democratic Party (1 Not 
at all, 7Very Much) and Republican Party (1 Not at all, 7 Very Much). Identification with the 
Republican Party was then reverse coded and scaled with identification with the Democratic 
Party (Cronbach’s alpha = .63), yielding scores ranging from -7 to 7. Participants who scored 
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between -7 and -2 on the scale were coded as Republicans. Participants who scored between -
1 and +1 on the scale were coded as Moderates. Participants who scored between +2 and +7 
on the scale were coded as Democrats. Moderates were excluded from some analyses 
because they could not be coded into group conflict types (e.g., ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-
on-outgroup, etc.). 
 After participants were coded for political party identity, the political identities of the 
moral transgressor and moral transgression target in the news stories were collapsed into the 
following categories: in-group on in-group violation, in-group on out-group violation, out-
group on in-group violation, out-group on out-group violation, and politically neutral. 
Democrat participants who saw a news story in which a Democrat attacked a Democrat were 
coded as seeing an in-group on in-group violation, as were Republican participants who saw 
a news story in which a Republican attacked a Republican. Democrats who a news story in 
which a Democrat attacked a Republican were coded as seeing an in-group on out-group 
violation, as were Republican participants who saw a news story in which a Republican 
attacked a Democrat. Democrat participants who saw a news story in which a Republican 
attacked a Republican were coded as seeing an out-group on out-group violation, as were 
Republican participants who saw a news story in which a Democrat attacked a Democrat. 
Democrat participants who saw a news story in which a Republican attacked a Democrat 
were coded as seeing an out-group on in-group violation, as were Republican participants 
who saw a news story in which a Democrat attacked a Republican. All participants who saw 
a news story in which the political identity of the actors in the news story was not identified 
were coded as seeing a politically neutral violation. Moderates were excluded from analyses 
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examining the effect of group identity on perceptions of a moral violation; they could not be 
coded as seeing in-group and out-group members. 
The news story stimuli depicted a fake event in Congress between real politicians. In 
all conditions, a lower-ranking politician attacked a higher-ranking politician (i.e., an 
authority violation occurred in every condition). In the Democrat-on-Democrat condition, the 
lower-ranking Democrat in the story was Senator Mark Warner (Virginia), and the higher-
ranking Democrat was Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (Nevada). In the Democrat-on-
Republican condition, the lower-ranking Democrat was Representative Chris van Hollen 
(Maryland), and the higher-ranking Republican was Speaker of the House John Boehner 
(Ohio). In the Republican-on-Democrat condition, the lower-ranking Republican was Senator 
Rob Portman (Ohio), and the higher-ranking Democrat was again Harry Reid. In the 
Republican-on-Republican condition, the lower-ranking Republican was Representative 
Scott Rigell (Virginia), and the higher-ranking Republican was again John Boehner. In the 
neutral condition, the lower-ranking politician was Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (Rhode 
Island) and the higher-ranking politician was Senator Mike Enzi (Wyoming). The political 
identities of the moral transgressor and the target of the authority violation were manipulated 
by changing their political parties. All other factors in the news story were held constant (See 
the “News Manipulation” section below for a detailed description of each condition).   
 The posted study on Amazon MTurk yielded 402 complete responses. Of those 
responses, 13 were excluded from analysis because the participant spent insufficient time 
(less than 10 seconds) reading the stimulus, 24 were excluded because their IP address 
appeared multiple times in the sample (addressing fears that one individual could complete 
the study multiple times), and 21 were excluded because they misidentified the higher-
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ranking politician and/or the political parties of the politicians in the news story (final N = 
344).  
Of the 344 respondents included for analysis, 174 were coded as Democrat, 96 
Moderate, and 60 Republican. Additionally, 173 identified as male (50.3%), 167 identified as 
female (48.5%), 2 identified as transgender (0.6%), and 2 declined to state (0.6%). 
Participants ranged in age from 20-69. One hundred and fourteen were between the ages of 
19-29 (33.1%), 130 were 30-39 (37.8%), 46 were 40-49 (13.4%), 52 were 50+ (15.1%), and 
2 declined to state (0.6%). Two hundred and fifty seven identified as White/Caucasian 
(74.7%), 28 identified as African-American (8.1%), 25 identified as Hispanic (7.3%), 21 
identified as Asian (6.1%), 11 identified as “Other” (3.2%), and 2 declined to state (0.6%). 
Four had not obtained a high school degree (1.2%), 40 had terminated education after a high 
school diploma or GED (11.6%), 94 had attended some college without obtaining a degree 
(27.3%), 40 had completed a 2-year college degree (11.6%), 124 had completed a 4-year 
college degree (36.0%), 33 had completed a Master’s degree (9.6%), 5 had completed a 
doctoral degree (1.5%), 2 had finished a JD or MD (0.6%), and 2 declined to state (0.6%). 
The sample was slightly more educated than the U.S. generally. According to U.S. census 
data, approximately 29.74% of adults over 25 terminated education after high school, 16.68% 
had attended some college without obtaining a degree, 9.93% had obtained an associate’s 
degree, 20.19% had obtained a 4-year college degree, 8.5% had obtained a Master’s degree, 
1.5% had obtained a professional degree, and 1.77% had obtained a doctoral degree.  
Procedure  
Participants completed the study online at a location of their choice, mimicking 
online political news consumption in the real world. They were assured that they could 
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terminate participation in the study at any time and still receive full payment. The study 
consisted of three parts: assessment of moral domain salience, exposure to a moral violation 
via the news story stimulus, and ratings of the moral transgressor’s moral character.  
Moral Domain Salience. Participants first completed the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) and the Moral Foundations Sacredness 
Scale (MFSS; Graham & Haidt, 2012). These scales were included to make the moral 
domains salient to participants and to serve as potential moderating variables. Moral domain 
salience was assessed to test the relationship between intuitive morality and reactions to 
moral violations in the news. Consistent with past research in MFT and MIME (e.g., Eden et 
al., 2014; Tamborini et al., 2013), the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) was used to measure moral domain salience of the five moral 
foundations. Questions on the MFQ are split between “relevance” type items (e.g., “This 
consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong/This is one of the 
most important factors in my judgments of right and wrong”) and “statement” type items 
(e.g., “One of the worst things a person can do is hurt a defenseless dog”). Each item was 
measured on a 6-point Likert-type scale, 1 Strongly disagree, 6 Strongly agree. Consistent 
with research on moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2009), prior to testing hypotheses, 
scales were created for the moral relevance of each of the five moral foundations. Cronbach’s 
alphas were .69 (care), .72 (fairness), .73 (loyalty), .75 (authority), and .87 (purity). 
News Story Conditions. To test for the effects of moral violations in news media on 
moral outrage, participants were randomly assigned to read one of five news stories depicting 
an authority violation in Congress (all news stories were attributed to ABC News). In the 
control condition, participants read a news story in which a low-ranking member of Congress 
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aggressively challenged the authority of a high-ranking member of Congress on matters of 
tax reform, with no mention of party affiliation.  
In the first inter-party conflict (authority violation) condition, participants read a news 
story in which a low-ranking member of the Democratic Party (Chris Van Hollen) 
aggressively questioned the authority of a high-ranking member of the Republican Party 
(John Boehner). In the second inter-party conflict condition, participants read a news story in 
which a low-ranking member of the Republican Party (Rob Portman) aggressively 
questioned the authority of a high-ranking member of the Democratic Party (Harry Reid). 
In the first intra-party conflict (loyalty violation + authority violation) condition, 
participants read a news story in which a low-ranking member of the Republican Party (Scott 
Rigell) aggressively questioned the authority of a high-ranking member of the Republican 
Party (John Boehner). In the second intra-party conflict condition, participants read a news 
story in which a low-ranking member of the Democratic Party (Mark Warner) aggressively 
questioned the authority of a high-ranking member of the Democratic Party (Harry Reid). 
The specific wording of the articles was as follows: 
 “House debate on tax reform turned partisan and ugly today when [low-ranking moral 
violator] challenged [high-ranking victim]. 
 
 At the conclusion of his comments on the bill, [violator] launched an attack on the 
[victim’s title], the highest ranking member of the [House of Representatives or Senate]. 
“[Victim], you have encouraged and enabled reckless behavior in Congress. Your leadership 
has no credibility. Stand down [victim], stand down” said [violator], a new but up-and-
coming member of the [political party]. Asked to comment, the young [violator] remarked: 
“[Victim] has repeatedly demonstrated that he is not qualified to discuss tax reform. He has 
lost all credibility. If we are going to make progress, we need new leadership. The American 
people deserve better.” 
 
 [Victim], who has represented [state’s nth] District since [date of entry to Congress] 
and served as [currently position] since 2011, fired back: “My goal is to help our economy 
and boost job creation. That has been my goal for the 23 years I’ve served in Congress and 
that’s not going to change.” 
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 “[Violator’s] comments will likely undermine [victim’s] ability to push for a vote on 
the reform bill before the House goes on recess later this week,” said [politically Independent 
member of Congress], who has advocated against partisan bickering in Congress.” 
 
Dependent Measures 
 Emotional Reaction Measures. After reading the news story, participants were 
immediately assessed for their emotional reactions to the actions of the moral transgressor in 
the news story. First, they rated how the news story affected them on negative (angry, 
disgusted, irritated, offended, outraged) and positive (happy, entertained, supportive) 
emotions, all measured 5-point Likert-type scale, 1 Not at all, 5 Extremely). The negative 
emotion items were combined to create an anger scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .92); the positive 
emotions were combined to create a support scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84).  
Next, participants rated whether the moral transgressor’s behavior was moral/immoral 
(7-point Likert-type scale, 1 extremely immoral, 7 extremely moral), justified/unjustified (7-
point Likert-type scale, 1 extremely unjustified, 7 extremely justified), and okay/wrong (7-
point Likert-type scale, 1 completely okay, 7 completely wrong, reverse coded for analysis). 
They also assessed whether the moral transgressor’s behavior should be stopped (1 Definitely 
stopped, 7 Definitely not stopped) and how the moral transgressor’s actions made them feel 
(1 Extremely negative, 7 Extremely positive). These five items were combined to create a 
behavior judgment scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .92). Finally, participants assessed whether 
good or bad things would happen to the moral transgressor as a result of his actions (1 
Extremely bad, 7 Extremely good). These seven items were adapted from Eden and 
Tamborini (2010) and Tamborini et al. (2010). 
 Character Moral Foundations. After assessing their initial emotional reactions to the 
moral violation, participants completed the Character Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
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(CMFQ; Eden et al., 2014), which adapts the 16 “relevance” type items from the MFQ and 
applies them to characters in the media (each measured on a 6-point Likert-type scale, 1 
Strongly disagree, 6 Strongly agree). Also consistent with past research on the CMFQ, 
negatively-worded items were reverse-coded, and then scales were created for each of the 
five moral foundations: loyalty (“He betrays his group,” “He shows love for his country,” 
“He shows a lack of loyalty”), authority (“He conforms to the traditions of society,” “He 
shows a lack of respect for authority,” “He causes chaos or disorder”), care (“He causes 
others to suffer emotionally,” “He shows care for others who are weak and vulnerable,” “He 
is cruel”), fairness (“He treats some people differently than others,” “He acts unfairly,” “He 
denies others their rights”), and purity (“He violates standards of purity and decency,” “He 
does disgusting things,” “He acts in a way that God would approve of). Initial reliability 
analyses revealed Cronbach’s alphas of .67 (Care), .75 (Fairness), .60 (Loyalty), .42 
(Authority), and .47 (Purity). To increase reliability, one item was removed from the loyalty 
scale (“He shows love for his country”), authority scale (“He conforms to the traditions of 
society”), and purity scale (“He acts in a way that God would approve of”), bringing their 
Cronbach’s alpha scores to .77, .64, and .77, respectively. For all scales, a higher score 
means adherence to the moral foundation; a lower score means violation of the moral 
foundation. 
Interest in and Enjoyment of News Story. Lewis et al. (2014) demonstrated that 
interest in a narrative and enjoyment of the narrative are separate constructs. To assess 
interest, participants rated how interesting and well-written they found the news story (5-
point Likert, 1 Not at all, 5 A lot). Cronbach’s alpha for the interest scale was .72. Enjoyment 
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was measured by a single item measuring how entertaining participants found the news story 
(5-point Likert, 1 Not at all, 5 A lot).  
 Story Credibility. Story credibility and political knowledge were assessed as control 
variables. To measure story credibility, participants rated the news story for how believable, 
balanced, trustworthy, credible, factual, and fair it was (5-point Likert, 1 Not at all, 5 A lot). 
Cronbach’s alpha for the credibility scale was .91.  
 Political Knowledge. Political knowledge was assessed using five open-ended items 
recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993): identifying which party controls the 
House of Representatives (79.5% of participants answered correctly), identifying the 
percentage of Congress needed to override a veto (82.8% answered correctly), identifying the 
vice president (95.3% answered correctly), which branch of the government is responsible 
for judicial review (79.1% answered correctly), and identifying the relative ideological 
location of the two political parties, on a scale from 1 to 100 (1 Very liberal, 100 Very 
Conservative). On average, Democrats were rated as a 29.27 and Republicans as a 76.56.  
 Manipulation checks. Perceived politician status and perceived politician party were 
assessed as manipulation checks. Participants were asked to identify who was the higher 
ranking person in the news story and to which political party the low-ranking and high-
ranking politicians belonged. There were 31 instances of participants misidentifying the high-
ranking politician, 19 of participants misidentifying the party identification of the low-
ranking politician, and 19 of participants misidentifying the party-identification of the high-
ranking politician. Because some participants made more than one of these mistakes, 21 
participants were excluded from analysis (5 from the Democrat-on-Democrat condition, 3 
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from the Democrat-on-Republican condition, 6 from the Republican-on-Democrat condition, 
4 from the Republican-on-Republican condition, and 3 from the neutral condition). 
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Chapter 5: Results 
Moral Foundation Weight and Political Identity 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that Republicans would weight the loyalty, purity, and 
authority foundations higher than Democrats, while Democrats would rate the fairness and 
care foundations higher than Republicans. To test this hypothesis, a Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) was conducted with political identity as a between-subjects 
independent variable (Democrats, Moderates, Republicans) and the individuals’ weightings 
on each of the five moral foundations as the dependent measures (care, fairness, loyalty, 
authority, and purity). The MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate effect of political 
position on the weights of the five moral foundations, Wilk’s λ = .72, F(10, 646) = 11.47, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .15. Results from univariate ANOVAs revealed significant differences 
between Democrats and Republicans on all 5 of the moral foundations that were consistent 
with the pattern observed by Graham et al. (2009). 
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Figure 1: Relevance of moral foundations across self-reported political identity. 
 Loyalty. Republicans (M = 3.79) weighted the loyalty foundation significantly higher 
than did Moderates (M = 3.31, p < .01) and Democrats (M = 3.15, p < .001), F(2, 327) = 
12.55, p < .001, partial η2 = .07. Democrats and Moderates did not differ significantly from 
each other (p = .33).  
 Authority. Republicans (M = 4.13) weighted the authority foundation significantly 
higher than did Moderates (M = 3.47, p < .001) and Democrats (M = 3.39, p < .001), F(2, 
327) = 16.51, p < .001, partial η2 = .09. Democrats and Moderates did not differ significantly 
from each other (p = .77). 
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 Care. Democrats (M = 4.82) weighted the care foundation significantly higher than 
did Moderates (M = 4.52, p < .01) and Republicans (M = 4.42, p < .01), F(2, 327) = 27.90, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .15. Republicans and Moderates did not differ significantly from each 
other (p = .73). 
 Fairness. Democrats (M = 4.87) weighted the fairness foundation significantly higher 
than did Moderates (M = 4.49, p < .001) and Republicans (M = 4.26, p < .001), F(2, 327) = 
19.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .10. Republicans and Moderates did not differ significantly from 
each other (p = .15). 
 Purity. Republicans (M = 3.98) weighted the purity foundation significantly higher 
than did Moderates (M = 3.23, p < .001) and Democrats (M = 2.71, p < .001), F(2, 327) = 
27.90, p < .001, partial η2 = .15. Additionally, Moderates weighted the purity foundation 
significantly higher than did Democrats (p < .01).   
 Hypothesis 1 was fully supported. Past research on moral foundations theory 
(Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2012) suggests that conservatives weight the loyalty, 
authority, and purity significantly higher than liberals, while liberals weight the harm/care 
and fairness foundations significantly higher than conservatives. Differences between 
Democrats and Republicans in the present sample follow this pattern. 
Tests of Focal Hypotheses 
 MIME proposes that how audience members weight the importance of the five moral 
foundations described by MFT influences how they perceive people in the media and impacts 
their interest in and enjoyment of mediated narratives (Tamborini, 2011). Specifically, if an 
audience member gives high importance to a foundation (e.g., authority), they should judge a 
moral transgressor who violates that foundation (e.g., undermines an authority figure) more 
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harshly than an audience member who gives low importance to that foundation; they should 
also experience more interest in and enjoyment of the mediated narrative. Because research 
on MFT shows that Republicans place more weight on the authority and loyalty foundations 
than do Democrats, Republicans should judge people who violate those foundations more 
harshly than do Democrats. Republicans should also display greater interest and enjoyment 
of news stories depicting authority and loyalty violations.  
 Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) adds a wrinkle to this argument: people 
often do not recognize moral violations against outgroup members, especially when the 
violation leads to an ingroup gain. Research applying SIT to media use indicates that people 
enjoy media in which ingroup members are portrayed positively and outgroup members are 
portrayed negatively, especially when the ingroup and outgroup are in conflict (e.g., 
Harwood, 1999; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2006; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 
2010; Rivadeneyra et al., 2007; Ward, 2004). If SIT is correct, Democrats and Republicans 
will demonstrate similar reactions to moral violations as they occur within and between 
groups (i.e., innate differences between how Democrats and Republicans weight the five 
moral foundations will be washed out by the group status of the moral transgressor and the 
target of the moral violation).  
Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4, and 5, along with Research Question 1, addressed how weights 
of the moral foundations and social identity processes interact to influence perceptions of a 
moral transgressor’s moral character. They were tested using Analyses of Covariance in 
which political identity and type of political conflict are factorial independent variables, and 
the five moral foundations are controlled. These analyses allow for tests of the effects of 
social identity processes independent of individual differences in moral foundations. In all 
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analyses, a higher score means more adherence to the foundation being examined. 
Additionally, because Moderates could not be reliably coded as seeing ingroup or outgroup 
members, they were excluded from these analyses. 
 To preserve order of causality, a hierarchical analysis was conducted (i.e., using Type 
1 sums of squares) in which participants’ moral values are entered first, followed by political 
identities (which moral foundations theory assumes emerge from moral foundations), 
followed by the experimental manipulations. Two-way interaction terms followed the same 
hierarchy (i.e., the interaction between moral values and political identification followed by 
moral values and experimental condition, followed by political identification and 
experimental condition). 
Tests of authority ratings 
 Hypotheses 2a and 4 were tested via a 2 (political identity: Democrat vs. Republican) 
x 5 (conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, 
outgroup-on-ingroup, or party-neutral) ANCOVA, controlling for individual trait weights of 
the authority foundation. Hypothesis 2a predicted that Republicans would rate a moral 
transgressor who committed an authority violation lower on the Character Moral Foundation 
authority scale than would Democrats. Despite predictions from MFT and MIME that 
Republicans would judge authority violations more harshly than Democrats, and despite 
findings that Republicans in the sample do weight the authority foundation higher than 
Democrats, there was no evidence that Democrats and Republicans differed on their ratings 
of the moral transgressor’s respect for authority, F(1, 214) = .015, p = .90, ηp2 = .00. 
Hypothesis 2a was not supported. 
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 However, analyses did reveal a significant main effect for conflict type on ratings of 
the moral transgressor’s authority, F(4, 214) = 5.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Participants who saw 
an ingroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 4.60) rated the moral transgressor significantly higher 
on authority (i.e., more respectful of authority) than did participants who saw an outgroup-
on-ingroup violation (M = 3.79, p < .05), consistent with an SIT perspective.  
Authority ratings by political party identification 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that ratings of a moral transgressor’s authority would be 
lowest for a news story in which there was an ingroup-on-ingroup authority violation, 
followed by, in order, a news story in which there was an outgroup-on-ingroup authority 
violation, a news story in which there was an outgroup-on-outgroup authority violation, a 
news story in which there was a party-neutral authority violation, and highest for a news 
story in which there was an ingroup-on-outgroup authority violation. Because of sample 
imbalances in number of Democrats (n = 174) and Republicans (n = 60), effects of conflict 
type on ratings of authority become more clear when pairwise comparisons are made within 
each political party. For example, Democrats who saw an ingroup-on-outgroup violation (M 
= 4.67) rated the moral transgressor significantly higher on authority than did Democrats who 
saw an ingroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 3.99, p < .05), an outgroup-on-ingroup violation 
(M = 3.61, p < .01), or an outgroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 3.97, p < .05). Additionally, 
Democrats who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup violation rated the moral transgressor 
significantly lower (i.e., more subversive) on authority than did Democrats who saw a party-
neutral violation (M = 4.24, p < .05). Interestingly, there were no significant differences 
among Republicans; due to the low number of Republicans, this may have resulted from low 
statistical power. Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. The ingroup-on-outgroup violation 
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was judged most positively, as predicted. However, the outgroup-on-ingroup violation was 
judged the most harshly, which was not predicted by MFT. 
 
Figure 2: Participants’ ratings of the moral transgressor’s respect for authority (1 being low, 
7 being high) by the type of conflict they saw 
Loyalty ratings 
 Hypotheses 3a and 5 were tested using a 2 (political identity: Democrat vs. 
Republican) x 5 (conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-
outgroup, outgroup-on-ingroup, or neutral) ANCOVA, controlling for individual trait 
weights on the loyalty foundation. Hypothesis 3a predicted that Republicans who read a news 
story featuring a loyalty violation would rate the moral transgressor significantly lower on a 
loyalty scale than would Democrats. Again, despite predictions from MFT and MIME that 
Republicans would judge loyalty violations more harshly than Democrats, and despite 
findings that Republicans in the sample do weight the loyalty foundation higher than 
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Democrats, there was no evidence for differences between Democrats and Republicans on 
their ratings of the moral transgressor’s loyalty, F(1, 214) = .33, p = .57, ηp2 = .00. 
Hypothesis 3a was not supported. 
 However, analyses did reveal a significant effect for participants’ trait weights of the 
loyalty foundation on ratings of the moral transgressor’s loyalty, F(1, 218) = 6.85, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .03. As the importance of the loyalty foundation increased among participants, their 
ratings of the moral transgressor’s loyalty decreased. This finding is consistent with MIME: 
judgments of moral transgressions in a mediated narrative become harsher as a foundation 
increases in importance. 
  Hypothesis 5 predicted that ratings of a moral transgressor’s loyalty would be lowest 
for a news story in which there was an ingroup-on-ingroup violation, followed by, in order, a 
news story in which there was an outgroup-on-outgroup violation, a news story in which 
there was a party-neutral violation, a news story in which there was an outgroup-on-ingroup 
violation, and highest for a news story in which there was an ingroup-on-outgroup loyalty 
violation (see Figure 3). There was a large main effect for conflict type on ratings of the 
moral transgressor’s adherence to the loyalty foundation, F(4, 218) = 24.49, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.31. However, the effect did not perfectly follow the pattern hypothesized in H5. Rather, 
participants who saw an ingroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 6.11) rated the moral 
transgressor significantly higher on loyalty than did participants who saw outgroup-on-
ingroup violation (M = 5.46, p < .05), a party-neutral violation (M = 5.27, p < .01), an 
ingroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 4.43, p < .001), or an outgroup-on-outgroup violation (M 
= 3.93, p < .001). Hypothesis 5 was partially supported. As predicted, the ingroup-on-
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outgroup violation was judged most positively. However, the ingroup-on-ingroup violation 
was not judged the most negatively. 
 
Figure 3: Participants’ ratings of the moral transgressor’s loyalty to the ingroup (1 being low, 
7 being high) by the type of conflict they saw 
 Loyalty ratings by political party identification. MFT leads to the prediction that 
there should be significant differences between Democrats and Republicans in ratings of the 
moral transgressor’s loyalty. SIT yields the prediction that there should be no significant 
difference between Democrats and Republicans, but should be a significant difference based 
on the conflict type. Splitting mean ratings of loyalty within Democrats and Republicans 
shows a pattern reflective of the SIT perspective (see Figure 4).  
Democrats who saw an ingroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 4.02) rated the moral 
transgressor significantly lower on loyalty (i.e., less loyal) than did Democrats who saw an 
ingroup-on-outgroup violation (5.95, p < .001), an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 5.17, 
p < .001), or a party-neutral violation (M = 5.30, p < .001). Additionally, Democrats who saw 
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an outgroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 4.02) rated the moral transgressor significantly 
lower on loyalty than did Democrats who saw an ingroup-on-outgroup (p < .001), outgroup-
on-ingroup (p < .001), or party-neutral violation (p < .001). Finally, Democrats who saw an 
ingroup-on-outgroup violation rated the moral transgressor significantly higher on ingroup 
loyalty than did Democrats in the outgroup-on-ingroup (p < .01) and party-neutral (p < .05) 
conditions. 
 Republicans who saw an outgroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 3.84) rated the moral 
transgressor significantly lower on loyalty than did Republicans who saw any other conflict 
type (ingroup-on-ingroup, M = 4.84, p < .05; ingroup-on-outgroup, M = 6.26, p < .001, 
outgroup-on-ingroup, M = 5.75, p < .001, party-neutral M = 5.23, p < .05). Additionally, 
Republicans who saw an ingroup-on-ingroup violation rated the moral transgressor 
significantly lower on loyalty than did Republicans who saw an ingroup-on-outgroup 
violation (p < .01). 
 The results displayed in Figure 4 largely conform to the SIT perspective on group 
identity and moral violations. Whereas MFT proposes Democrats and Republicans should 
differ in their ratings of loyalty violations, Democrats and Republicans in the sample look 
remarkably similar in their judgments of moral violations based on the group identity of the 
moral transgressor and the target of the moral violation. MFT suggests that because 
Republicans care more about loyalty violations than do Democrats, Republicans should be 
significantly lower in their ratings of loyalty violations. However, Republicans were higher 
in their ratings of ingroup-on-ingroup moral violations than were Democrats; they perceived 
a Republican who attacked another Republican as more loyal than did Democrats who saw a 
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Democrat attack a Democrat. Group identity appears to have played a major role in 
processing the loyalty violation. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of Republicans’ and Democrats’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s 
loyalty (1 being low, 7 being high) by the type of conflict they saw 
Testing Research Question 1 
 Research Question 1 asked how the type of conflict (ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-
outgroup, outgroup-on-ingroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, or party-neutral) in a news story 
depicting an authority violation would impact participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s 
care, fairness, and purity. Moral foundations theory posits that each of the five foundations is 
a discrete but interlinked cognitive structure (Haidt et al., 2009). It is unclear how 
perceptions of care, fairness, and purity should be influenced by violations of the loyalty and 
authority foundations. 
 Care ratings. A 2 (political identity: Democrat vs. Republican) x 5 (conflict type: 
ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-ingroup, or 
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neutral) ANCOVA was performed to test the impact of participants’ political identity and 
conflict type on perceptions of the moral transgressor’s care, controlling for individual trait 
weights of the care foundation. Analyses revealed a small but significant interaction between 
political identity and individual trait weights of care (F[1, 214] = 4.68, p < .05, ηp2 = .02) and 
a small but significant interaction between conflict type and individual trait weights of care 
(F[4, 214] = 4.21, p < .01, ηp2 = .07).  
 Analyses also revealed a large main effect for conflict type on ratings of the moral 
transgressor’s adherence to the care foundation, F(4, 214) = 18.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. 
Participants who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 3.56) rated the moral 
transgressor significantly lower on care (i.e., less caring) than participants in any other 
condition: ingroup-on-ingroup (M = 5.15, p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.10, p < 
.001), outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 4.79, p < .001), and party-neutral (M = 4.90, p < .001). 
 
Figure 5: Participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s care (1 being harmful, 7 being 
caring) by the type of conflict they saw 
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 Care ratings by political party identification. Split by political party, the main effect 
for conflict type on care ratings is as follows. Democrats who saw an ingroup-on-outgroup 
violation (M = 5.45) rated the moral transgressor significantly higher on care (i.e., more 
caring) than did Democrats who saw any other conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup violation 
(M = 4.89, p < .05), outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 3.88, p < .001), outgroup-on-
outgroup violation (M = 4.73, p < .01), and party-neutral violation (M = 4.87, p < .01). 
Additionally, Democrats who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup violation rated the moral 
transgressor significantly lower on care (i.e., less caring) than did Democrats who saw any 
other conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup (p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (p < .001), 
outgroup-on-outgroup (p < .001), and party-neutral (p < .001). 
 There were also significant differences among Republicans in ratings of the moral 
transgressor’s care based on the conflict type they saw. Republicans who saw an outgroup-
on-ingroup violation (M = 3.24) rated the moral transgressor significantly lower on care (i.e., 
less caring) than did Republicans who saw any other conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup 
violation (M = 5.41, p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 4.76, p < .01), outgroup-
on-outgroup violation (M = 4.86, p < .01), and party-neutral violation (M = 4.93, p < .01). 
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Figure 6: Republicans’ and Democrats’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s care (1 being 
harmful, 7 being caring) by the type of conflict they saw 
 Fairness ratings. A 2 (political identity: Democrat vs. Republican) x 5 (conflict type: 
ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-ingroup, or 
neutral) ANCOVA was performed to test the impact of participants’ political identity and 
conflict type on perceptions of the moral transgressor’s fairness, controlling for individual 
trait weights of the fairness foundation. Analyses revealed a small but significant interaction 
between conflict type and individual trait weights of the fairness foundation, F(4, 214) = 
2.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .04  
 Analyses also revealed a large main effect for conflict type on ratings of the moral 
transgressor’s adherence to the fairness foundation, F(4, 214) = 17.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. 
Participants who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup moral violation (M = 4.08) rated the moral 
transgressor significantly lower on fairness than did participants in any other condition: 
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ingroup-on-ingroup (M = 5.28, p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.36, p < .001), 
outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.09, p < .001), and party-neutral (M = 5.11, p < .001).  
 
Figure 7: Participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s fairness (1 being low, 7 being high) 
by the type of conflict they saw 
 Fairness ratings by political party identification. Examining the main effect for 
conflict type on perceptions of fairness among Democrats, participants who saw an outgroup-
on-ingroup violation (M = 3.95) rated the moral transgressor as significantly lower on 
fairness than did Democrats who saw any other conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup (M = 5.01, 
p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.58, p < .001), outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.11, p < 
.001), and party-neutral (M = 5.24, p < .001). Additionally, Democrats who saw an ingroup-
on-ingroup violation rated them significantly lower on fairness than did Democrats who saw 
an ingroup-on-outgroup violation (p < .05). Among Republicans, participants who saw an 
outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 4.21) rated the moral transgressor significantly lower on 
fairness than did participants who saw an ingroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 5.54, p < .01). 
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Figure 8: Republicans’ and Democrats’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s fairness (1 being 
low, 7 being high) by the type of conflict they saw 
 Purity ratings. A 2 (political identity: Democrat vs. Republican) x 5 (conflict type: 
ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-ingroup, or 
neutral) ANCOVA was performed to test the impact of participants’ political identity and 
conflict type on perceptions of the moral transgressor’s purity, controlling for individual trait 
weights of the purity foundation. Analyses revealed a small but significant main effect for 
political identity on ratings the moral transgressor’s purity, F(1, 214) = 4.47, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.03. Democrats (M = 5.67) rated the moral transgressor significantly lower on purity than did 
Republicans (M = 5.97).  
 Analyses also revealed a moderate main effect for conflict type on ratings of the 
moral transgressor’s adherence to the purity foundation, F(4, 214) = 9.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. 
Participants who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 5.30) rated the moral 
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transgressor significantly lower on purity than did participants who saw an ingroup-on-
ingroup (M = 6.03, p < .05) or ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.99, p < .05) violation. 
 Purity ratings by political party identification. Among Democrats, participants who 
saw an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 4.79) rated the moral transgressor significantly 
lower on purity than did Democrats who saw any other conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup (M 
= 5.62, p < .01), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 6.14, p < .001), outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.91, 
p < .001), and party-neutral (M = 5.89, p < .001). No significant differences were found 
among Republicans; again, this could be due to an issue with power (see Figure 9 for 
Republican mean ratings of purity based on the type of conflict they witnessed). 
 
Figure 9: Participants’ ratings of a moral transgressor’s purity (1 being low, 7 being high) by 
the type of conflict they saw 
Tests of SIT and MIME 
 MIME predicts that interest in and enjoyment of media are influenced by the 
portrayal of moral violations in mediated narratives. Audience members should be more 
interested in a narrative that portrays a violation of a moral foundation they weight heavily 
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and should be more entertained by narratives that depict punishments/rewards that align with 
their moral values (Tamborini, 2011). SIT predicts that media interest and enjoyment are 
influenced by the positive and negative portrayal of ingroup and outgroup members. Positive 
portrayals of ingroup members and negative portrayals of outgroup members should be more 
interesting and entertaining than negative portrayals of ingroup members and positive 
portrayals of outgroup members (e.g., Harwood, 1999; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 
2006; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010; Rivadeneyra et al., 2007; Ward, 2004).  
 Hypotheses 2b-e, 3b-e, 6, and 7 made predictions regarding the effect of moral 
violation type (authority and loyalty) and group conflict type (ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-
on-outgroup, etc.) on emotional reactions to the moral violation and interest in/enjoyment of 
the news story. They were tested via a 2 (political identity: Democrat vs. Republican) x 5 
(conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, outgroup-
on-ingroup, or neutral) Multivariate Analysis of Variance.  
 Emotional reactions to the news story. Participants were assessed for their anger at 
the moral violation, support of the moral transgressor’s actions, and perception of the 
morality of the moral transgressor’s actions. Analyses revealed significant main effects for 
the type of conflict in the news story on each these three dependent variables.  
 Anger. Hypotheses 2b and 3b predicted that Republicans would exhibit more anger at 
the authority and loyalty violations than would Democrats. However, there was no significant 
main effect for political identity on anger, F(1, 224) = .23, p = .63, ηp2 = .00. Hypotheses 2b 
and 3b were not supported. 
 Analyses did reveal a large main effect for conflict type on anger, F(4, 224) = 15.69, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .22. Participants who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 2.51) were 
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significantly angrier than participants who saw any other conflict type: ingroup-on-ingroup 
(M = 1.54, p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 1.30, p < .001), outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 
1.21, p < .001), and party-neutral (M = 1.46, p < .001). However, levels of anger were low 
overall. 
 
Figure 10: Participants’ ratings of anger at the moral violation (1 being low, 5 being high) by 
the type of conflict they saw 
 Support. Support was tested in two ways. First, via a positive emotion scale; second, 
via a scale measuring how moral participants believed the behavior to be. Hypotheses 2c and 
3c predicted that Republicans would exhibit less support of the moral transgressor’s action 
than would Democrats. However, there was not a significant main effect for political identity 
on participants’ positive emotions toward the moral transgressor’s actions, F(1, 224) = 2.21, 
p = .14, ηp2 = .01. There was also not a significant main effect for political identity on 
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perceptions of the overall morality of the moral transgressor’s action, F(1, 224) = 2.98, p = 
.09, ηp2 = .01. Hypotheses 2c and 3c were not supported.  
 Analyses did reveal a large main effect for conflict type on positive emotions toward 
the moral transgressor’s actions, F(4, 224) = 13.77, p = .001, ηp2 = .20. First, participants 
exhibited less positive emotion for an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 1.29) than any 
other violation type: ingroup-on-ingroup (M = 2.47, p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 
2.86, p < .001), outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 2.57, p < .001), and party-neutral (M = 1.98, p < 
.01). Moreover, participants felt less positive about a party-neutral violation than an ingroup-
on-outgroup violation (p < .001), an ingroup-on-ingroup violation (p < .05), and an outgroup-
on-outgroup violation (p < .05). 
 
Figure 11: Participants’ ratings of positive emotion at the moral violation (1 being low, 5 
being high) by the type of conflict they saw 
 Analyses also revealed a large main effect for conflict type on perceptions of the 
actions’ morality, F(4, 224) = 14.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. Participants perceived the outgroup-
on-ingroup violation (M = 3.17) as significantly less moral than any other violation type: 
2.86
2.47
1.29
2.57
1.98
1
2
3
4
5
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f p
os
iti
ve
 e
m
ot
io
ns
 to
w
ar
d 
th
e 
m
or
al
 v
io
la
tio
n
Conflict type
 
 
65 
ingroup-on-ingroup (M = 4.73, p < .001), ingroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.19, p < .001), 
outgroup-on-outgroup (M = 5.01, p < .001), and party-neutral (M = 4.54, p < .001). 
 
Figure 12: Participants’ ratings of the moral violation’s overall morality (1 being low, 7 
being high) by the type of conflict they saw 
 Interest in the news story. Hypotheses 2d and 3d predicted that Republicans would 
be more interested in news stories depicting authority and loyalty violations than would 
Democrats (because Republicans weight these foundations more heavily than do Democrats). 
Hypothesis 6 predicted participants’ ratings of interest in a news story would move from 
highest to lowest in the following pattern: highest for a news story in which there was an 
ingroup-on-ingroup violation, followed by, in order, a news story in which there was an 
outgroup-on-outgroup violation, a news story in which there was an outgroup-on-ingroup 
violation, a news story in which there was an ingroup-on-outgroup authority violation, and 
lowest for a news story in which there was a party-neutral violation. 
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 Analyses did not show a significant main effect for political identity on interest in the 
news story, F(1, 224) = 2.06, p = .15, ηp2 = .01. There were no significant differences 
between Democrats and Republicans in ratings of interest in the news story. Hypotheses 2d 
and 3d were not supported. 
 Analyses did reveal a significant main effect for conflict type on interest in the news 
story, F(4, 224) = 3.71, p < .01, ηp2 = .06. Participants found the news story depicting an 
outgroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 3.79) significantly more interesting than they found the 
news story depicting an outgroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 3.11, p < .01) or a party-neutral 
violation (M = 3.04, p < .01). They also found the news story depicting an ingroup-on-
ingroup violation significantly more interesting than the news story depicting a party-neutral 
violation (p < .05). Hypothesis 6 was partially supported.  
 Analyses also revealed a significant interaction effect between political identity and 
conflict type on news story interest, F(4, 224) = 2.79, p < .05, ηp2 = .05. Republicans (M = 
4.03) found the news story depicting an ingroup-on-ingroup violation significantly more 
interesting than did Democrats (M = 3.03, p < .001).  
 Entertainment by the news story. Hypotheses 2e and 3e predicted that Republicans 
would be less entertained by the news story than would Democrats (because the news story 
does not depict punishment for the moral transgression). Hypothesis 7 predicted that 
participants would be most entertained by a news story in which an ingroup member 
undermined the authority of an outgroup member, followed by, in order, a news story in 
which an outgroup member undermined the authority of an outgroup member, a news story 
in which an outgroup member undermined the authority of an ingroup member, and a news 
story in which an ingroup member undermined the authority of an ingroup member. 
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 Analyses did not show a significant main effect for political identity on perceptions of 
how entertaining the news story was, F(1, 224) = 1.58, p = .21, ηp2 = .01. There were no 
significant differences between Democrats and Republicans in their perceptions of how 
entertaining the news story was. Hypotheses 2e and 3e were not supported. 
 Analyses did reveal a significant main effect for conflict type on participants’ 
perceptions of how entertaining the news story was, F(4, 224) = 4.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. 
Participants found the news story depicting an outgroup-on-outgroup violation (M = 3.70) 
significantly more entertaining than the stories depicting an outgroup-on-ingroup (M = 2.71, 
p < .001) or party-neutral violation (M = 2.60, p < .001). Additionally, participants found the 
news story depicting an ingroup-on-ingroup violation (M = 3.26) significantly more 
entertaining than participants who saw an outgroup-on-ingroup (p < .05) or party-neutral 
violation (p < .05). Hypothesis 7 was partially supported. 
 
Figure 13: Participants’ ratings of how entertaining the news story was (1 being low, 5 being 
high) by the type of conflict they saw 
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 Analyses also revealed a significant interaction effect between political identity and 
conflict type on entertainment perceptions, F(4, 224) = 2.67, p < .05, ηp2 = .05. Republicans 
(M = 3.81) found the news story depicting an ingroup-on-ingroup violation significantly 
more entertaining than did Democrats (M = 2.71, p < .01). 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 The present study was an attempt to test and integrate two theoretical perspectives 
that lead to equally logical but competing hypotheses: moral foundations theory/MIME, 
which propose innate weights to five moral foundations affect judgments of moral 
transgressors, as well as interest in and enjoyment of mediated narratives; and social identity 
theory, which argues the group status of the moral transgressor and the violation target affect 
judgments of moral transgressors, as well as interest in and enjoyment of mediated 
narratives. In the past, both perspectives have been applied to a political context. MFT 
research has found differences between how liberals and conservatives weight the five moral 
foundations (e.g., Graham et al., 2009), and SIT research has demonstrated group status 
influences perceptions of the legitimacy of political power (e.g., Fielding & Hogg, 1997; 
Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997). This area of overlap facilitated crafting a quasi-experiment in 
which both MFT and SIT could be tested. 
 The two perspectives were tested by showing participants a news story depicting an 
authority moral violation in Congress. However, each news story depicted a different type of 
group conflict: intragroup (Democrat attacking a Democrat, Republican attacking a 
Republican), intergroup (Democrat attacking a Republican, Republican attacking a 
Democrat), or group neutral (political identity of people in the news story was not present). 
MFT and MIME propose that because innate moral foundations guide moral judgments, the 
group status of the people in the narrative should matter less than audience members’ innate 
weights of each foundation. Because Republicans weight authority and loyalty more heavily 
than Democrats, Republicans should judge the moral transgressor in the news story more 
harshly. In contrast, SIT suggests that the group status of the people in the news story should 
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matter tremendously. People should judge moral violations that hurt their ingroup harshly but 
should judge moral violations that hurt an outgroup positively. Though the present study 
found some evidence supporting both perspectives, most of the results indicate the type of 
group conflict portrayed in the news story was a stronger predictor of reactions to the news 
story than were innate weights of the five moral foundations. 
 The following section will contextualize findings in past research on MFT, MIME, 
and SIT, identifying ways that the results confirm and contradict core ideas from each of 
these perspectives. It will identify limitations of the study, especially regarding the quasi-
experimental design and the strength of the news story stimulus. It will also discuss strengths 
of the study and suggest directions for future research. 
Implications for Moral Foundations Theory 
 Past research on MFT shows that liberals and conservatives weight the five moral 
foundations differently. Conservatives give more weight to the loyalty, authority, and purity 
foundations than do liberals; liberals give more weight to the care and fairness foundations 
than do conservatives (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2012). The 
present study confirms these findings. Republicans, the more conservative political party, 
reported heavier weights to the authority, loyalty, and purity foundations. Democrats, the 
more liberal political party, reported heavier weights to the care and fairness foundations. 
These differences could have important implications for research on the development of 
political identity as well as for the functioning of government. 
 Haidt and colleagues (e.g., Graham et al., 2011) have argued that liberal and 
conservative identities arise from innate weights of individualizing (care and fairness) versus 
binding (authority, loyalty, and purity) moral foundations. That is, people are largely born 
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with strong predispositions toward liberal and conservative ideologies; these predispositions 
are inherited genetically from parents. One key to supporting this assertion is the consistent 
demonstration that liberals and conservatives weight the foundations differently. Though the 
present study cannot make claims about the causal direction between moral foundation 
weights and liberalism/conservatism, it adds to the existing body of literature showing 
differences in foundation weights between liberals and conservatives. 
 As Graham et al. (2009) have discussed, differences between the moral values of 
Democrats and Republicans might underlie the ideological “culture war” in the United 
States. Neither side is open to the concerns or rhetoric of the opposition because they do not 
share the same set of concerns; what’s moral to one is immoral to the other, and vice versa. 
As Graham et al. (2012) note, the divide between liberals and conservatives is likely 
exacerbated by inaccurate, exaggerated views that each group holds about the other; liberals 
think conservatives value fairness far less than Republicans actually do, and Republicans 
think Democrats value loyalty far less than they actually do. This research may partially 
explain why Democrats and Republicans were harshest in their judgments of the moral 
character of outgroup members attacking ingroup members: each group characterizes the 
other as less moral overall in general.   
 The study also raises some questions about moral foundations theory, though 
admittedly questions it has raised about itself. Graham et al. (2013) discuss the tendency of 
individuals to self-report certain weights of the moral foundations but exhibit different 
weights when assessed using implicit measures. This was especially true of liberals, who 
appeared more conservative when making quick moral judgments under high cognitive load. 
In the present study, Democrats scored lower on loyalty, authority, and purity than did 
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Republicans. However, when rating a moral transgressor on these foundations, Democrats 
displayed ingroup favoritism to Democrats who attacked Republicans and displayed 
outgroup denigration to Republicans who attacked Democrats. Meanwhile, Republicans 
scored lower on care and fairness than Democrats, but displayed ingroup favoritism to 
Republicans who attacked Democrats and Republicans who attacked Republicans (the latter, 
perhaps, due to their penchant toward ingroup loyalty). The significant effects for purity, 
fairness, and care, foundations that were not explicitly violated in the news story, leads to 
questions about the discreteness of the moral foundations. 
 Haidt and colleagues argue that the moral foundations are discrete cognitive 
structures, each formed by different social selection pressures. The present study tried to 
trigger two of the foundations: authority (in the form of a lower-ranking politician subverting 
a higher-ranking politician) and loyalty (in the form of one ingroup member subverting 
another ingroup member). Interestingly, the authority and loyalty violations also influenced 
participants’ views of the moral transgressor’s care, fairness, and purity, especially in an 
intergroup conflict context. One possible explanation is that liberals and conservatives hold 
inaccurate, exaggerated views about the emphasis each other places on the five moral 
foundations. For example, Graham et al. (2012) found that liberals think conservatives care 
about care and fairness (the individualizing foundations) less than conservatives actually do, 
and conservatives think liberals care about purity, authority, and loyalty (the binding 
foundations) less than liberals actually do. These inaccurate views could have been 
automatically extended to the outgroup. 
 However, Graham et al. (2013) also found that liberals tend to over-estimate how 
much conservatives care about the binding foundations, while conservatives over-estimate 
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how much liberals care about the individualizing foundations. In the present study, 
Democrats rated Republicans lower on the binding foundations, especially when a 
Republican attacked a Democrat. Additionally, Republicans rated Democrats lower in the 
individualizing foundations, especially when a Democrat attacked a Republican. Participants 
appeared to make instant, negative judgments about outgroup members attacking ingroup 
members, and then assign the behavior a negative moral valence. These findings cannot be 
fully explained by the literature on moral foundations and political stereotyping. They might 
point to a larger issue with the discreteness of the moral foundations. 
 Participants demonstrated an ability to rationally distinguish among the five moral 
foundations while self-assessing their importance. They recognized a difference between 
authority and loyalty, for instance, and assigned them different weights accordingly. 
However, when practically assessing the moral character of a transgressor, participants 
routinely punished the moral transgressor for violations the transgressor did not explicitly 
commit (care, fairness, and purity). Morality is in the eye of the beholder; a care violation to 
one person might not be a violation at all to another person. Overlaps in judgments across the 
moral foundations make it difficult to discern just how discrete the five moral foundations are 
from each other. This points to a larger issue with research in evolutionary psychology: 
scholars have to speculate about an environment that existed thousands of years ago. If moral 
violations in the modern world do not trigger reactions to discrete moral foundations, how 
“discrete” were the selection pressures that led to the formation of the five foundations?   
Implications for MIME 
 MIME (Tamborini, 2011) predicts a linear causal path from exposure to morally 
relevant content to appraisals of moral violators and enjoyment of/interest in media content. 
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The present study marks one of the first attempts to experimentally examine MIME in a news 
context (Bowman, Lewis, and Tamborini, 2014, performed a content analysis of U.S. 
headlines after Osama bin Laden’s death using MIME as a framework). Results supported 
MIME’s assertion that higher innate weight of a moral foundation increases harshness of 
judgments of a person who violates that moral foundation, but only for the loyalty 
foundation. As weight of the loyalty foundation increased among participants, their ratings of 
ingroup-on-ingroup and outgroup-on-outgroup violators decreased. However, other findings 
either failed to support (authority) or directly conflicted (purity) with MIME. 
 An authority violation occurred in every condition. It was highly expected that, 
averaging across all conditions, Republicans would rate the moral transgressor lower on 
authority than would Democrats. This was not the case, nor was innate trait weight of the 
authority foundation a significant predictor of the moral transgressor’s authority. 
Additionally, results indicated that across all conditions, Democrats rated the moral 
transgressor lower on purity than did Republicans; this is the opposite of what MIME 
predicts, because Democrats care less about purity than do Republicans (in fact, in terms of 
differences in mean scores, Democrats and Republicans were more different on weights of 
purity than any other foundation). 
 MIME (Tamborini, 2011) also predicts that as moral foundation weight increases, 
interest in a narrative depicting a violation of that foundation increases. As such, because 
Republicans in the present sample weighted authority and loyalty more heavily than 
Democrats, Republicans should have shown more interest in the news story than Democrats. 
However, this was only partially the case. While there was no main effect for political 
identity on interest in the news story, there was an interaction effect between political 
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identity and conflict type on interest in the news story. Republicans were significantly more 
interested in the ingroup-on-ingroup violation than were Democrats. The ingroup-on-ingroup 
condition depicts an authority violation and a loyalty violation; this finding is consistent with 
MIME.  
 MIME further predicts that audience members enjoy narratives less when they depict 
unpunished, heavily-weighted moral violations (Eden et al., 2014; Lewis, Tamborini, & 
Weber, 2014; Tamborini et al., 2012; Tamborini et al., 2013). The news story stimulus in the 
present study did not depict punishment of the moral transgressor, so Republicans should 
have reported enjoying the news story less than Democrats. There was not a significant 
difference in how much Republicans and Democrats enjoyed the news story, except when 
political identity interacted with conflict type. Republicans reported being significantly more 
entertained by the ingroup-on-ingroup conflict than did Democrats. This finding is the 
opposite of what MIME predicts. One possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that 
Republican participants were demonstrating their ingroup loyalty by refusing to be critical of 
a fellow Republican. If Republicans value ingroup loyalty more than Democrats, they might 
have felt less willing to criticize an ingroup member.  
 The findings on MIME and story interest/enjoyment are corroborated by findings on 
emotional reactions to the moral transgression. Participants experienced the highest level of 
anger of the actions portrayed in the news story when the story depicted an outgroup-on-
ingroup violation (this was true of both Democrats and Republicans). Participants also felt 
least supportive of the outgroup-on-ingroup violation, and they rated the violation as 
significantly less moral overall than any other violation type. Again, there was no main effect 
for political identity on emotional reactions to the news story. 
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 In sum, MIME proposes that innate weights to moral foundations influence audience 
members’ perceptions of the morality of characters in narratives, as well as their interest in 
and enjoyment of narratives. While some evidence was found to support this prediction, most 
of the differences between Democrats and Republicans in perceptions of character morality 
and interest in/enjoyment of the news story was better explained by the nature of the group 
conflict in the news story. At least in the context of narratives that depict conflict between 
identifiable ingroups and outgroups, MIME could increase its predictive power by 
incorporating research on morality in intergroup contexts. 
Implications for Intergroup Morality Research 
 Graham et al. (2013) acknowledge the importance of intergroup selection pressures in 
shaping the cognitive networks responsible for processing morality. The “binding” 
foundations are explicitly group related (authority and loyalty relate to group cohesion; purity 
relates to avoiding harmful pathogens carried by geographically distant clans). In testing 
MFT, Bruneau et al. (2012) found that moral regard was lower for threatening outgroup 
members than for ingroup or non-threatening outgroup members. Group psychology clearly 
plays a role in morality judgments. 
 In the present study, the type of conflict (ingroup-on-ingroup, ingroup-on-outgroup, 
outgroup-on-ingroup, outgroup-on-outgroup, or party-neutral) depicted in the news story 
significantly predicted perceptions of the moral transgressor’s character on all five of the 
moral foundations, even when performing a Type I sum of squares and entering participants’ 
innate weights of the moral foundations into the model first. Participants rated an ingroup-on-
outgroup attacker as significantly more respectful of authority than an outgroup-on-ingroup 
attacker. The effects became even more pronounced when examining differences just among 
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Democrats: the ingroup-on-outgroup attacker was rated higher on authority than outgroup-
on-outgroup, ingroup-on-ingroup, and outgroup-on-ingroup attackers. From an MFT 
perspective, this finding is surprising; Democrats care less about authority than do 
Republicans. However, it is perfectly explained by research on group identity and leadership 
endorsement. Individuals do not perceive the authority held by outgroup members as 
legitimate, and are more favorable to leaders who exhibit stereotypical ingroup traits 
(Fielding & Hogg, 1997; Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997). 
 The ingroup-on-outgroup attacker received a similar boost over the outgroup-on-
ingroup attacker when participants rated the moral transgressor’s loyalty. Moreover, among 
Republicans, the ingroup-on-ingroup attacker was rated as more loyal than the outgroup-on-
outgroup attacker. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) would explain these 
differences in terms of the audience’s desire for positive distinctiveness, perhaps through the 
social competition method. Participants were trying to preserve their positive group identity 
by assigning more favorable ratings to ingroup members and less favorable ratings to 
outgroup members in the classic favoritism/denigration pattern.  
 Social identity theory may also help explain observed differences in ratings of the 
moral transgressor’s care, fairness, and purity, the three foundations that were not explicitly 
violated in the news story. Participants rated the outgroup-on-ingroup attacker as 
significantly less caring than every other type of attacker. Additionally, Democrats in the 
sample rated the ingroup-on-outgroup attacker as significantly more caring than every other 
type of attacker. These findings comport with research on moral boundaries (Brewer, 2007; 
Opotow, 2000). An opposing political party represents a threat for power and resources. This 
situation encourages ingroup favoritism (cohesion is key to success in an intergroup conflict) 
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and outgroup denigration. Thus, an outgroup member falls outside of the scope of justice. A 
similar explanation could be applied to participants’ ratings of the moral transgressor’s 
fairness. As in care, participants rated an outgroup-on-ingroup attacker significantly lower on 
fairness than every other type of attacker.  
 Research on moral boundaries (Opotow, 2000) may help explain differences in 
ratings of purity based on conflict type. Purity is tied to pathogen avoidance, and threatening 
outgroup members are often characterized as unclean or associated with disease-carrying 
creatures (vermin, insects, etc.). In the present study, Democrats rated the outgroup-on-
ingroup attacker significantly lower on purity than every other condition (while no significant 
differences were found among Republicans). This could be because the intergroup threat 
triggered networks associated with pathogen fears. However, it is surprising that no 
significant differences were found among Republicans, who care more about purity than do 
Democrats. 
     The tests of emotional reaction to the news story also align with a SIT explanation. 
Participants were angriest when they saw an outgroup-on-ingroup attack because it threatens 
positive distinctiveness. Similarly, participants reported being least supportive of the 
outgroup-on-ingroup attack. The outgroup threat elicited negative emotions. Further, 
participants rated this attack as significantly less moral overall (on a moral/immoral 
composite scale) than every other type of attack. As Brewer (2007) proposes, people often 
feel morally superior to outgroup members. Both Democrats and Republicans in the present 
study appear to feel morally superior to their political opponents. 
 The type of conflict portrayed in the news story explained more variance in 
participants’ ratings of interest in and enjoyment of the news story than did political identity 
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or innate weights of the moral foundations. Participants found the story depicting an 
outgroup-on-outgroup violation to be the most interesting, significantly more so than the 
news story depicting an outgroup-on-ingroup or party-neutral violation. The outgroup-on-
outgroup violation was also rated as the most entertaining. This is consistent with SIT 
research on media exposure and self-enhancement. Media containing negative depictions of 
outgroup members tend to boost self-esteem, which makes those media more gratifying 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2006; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010; Ward, 
2004). An outgroup-on-outgroup attack indicates a lack of cohesion within the outgroup, 
which is highly relevant and encouraging information during periods of intergroup conflict. 
In contrast, media depicting ingroup members negatively (e.g., an outgroup member 
attacking an ingroup member) have a negative impact on self-esteem and are less enjoyable 
to audience members. 
Broad Implications 
 Perhaps the broadest implication of this study is that individuals filter their moral 
judgments through their group identities. While it’s likely that people are predisposed to care 
more about certain types of moral violations than others, group identity plays such a 
powerful role in assessing morality that people’s innate moral weights can be reversed. For 
example, Democrats in the present study weight authority, loyalty, and purity as less 
important than do Republicans. Despite these innate differences, Democrats and Republicans 
looked remarkably similar when assessing ingroup-on-outgroup and outgroup-on-ingroup 
moral violations: ingroup-on-outgroup violators were judged favorably, outgroup-on-ingroup 
violators were judged harshly. Similarly, Republicans weighted care and fairness 
significantly lower than Democrats, but still gave high ratings to ingroup-on-outgroup 
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violators and low ratings to outgroup-on-ingroup violators. With a simple group status 
manipulation, Democrats were made to look like Republicans, and Republicans were made to 
look like Democrats (morally speaking).  
 This study also has broad implications for media interest and enjoyment. MIME 
predicts that audience members should be most interested in narratives that depict violations 
of moral foundations that the audience weights heavily. Group identity appears to play a 
significant role in this process. In fact, a news story depicting an authority violation without 
the group identity of the attacker and victim present was rated as least interesting and 
entertaining overall. Participants were most interested and entertained by moral violations 
against outgroup members and were less entertained by moral violations against ingroup 
members. As SIT predicts, participants strongly preferred a news story that portrays an 
outgroup member negatively over one that portrays an ingroup member negatively. This 
could have implications for selective exposure. 
 MIME (Tamborini, 2011) proposes that selective exposure to media content occurs 
because audience members seek out narratives depicting violations of foundations they 
weight heavily. Over time, repeated exposure causes audience members to become more 
rigid in their foundation weights and more likely to expose selectively. In contrast, research 
on SIT (e.g., Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010) results from individuals seeking out 
positive and avoiding negative information about their ingroup as a status enhancement tool. 
The present study found that the type of group conflict depicted in a news story was more 
predictive of interest in and enjoyment of that news story than was innate foundation 
weights. As such, at least in the context of narratives that depict violations within and 
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between identifiable groups, SIT may provide a better explanation of the selective exposure 
phenomenon.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study had several limitations that should be addressed. First, the study employed 
a quasi-experimental design rather a true experimental design. Because participants did not 
complete the study in a lab, it is impossible to say if each participant completed the study 
under precisely the same conditions. While one benefit of this design is that participants were 
exposed to the news story in a more naturalistic setting, it is still possible that some 
participants were influenced by external stimuli. Random assignment to experimental 
conditions provides some safeguard against possible third variables, but concerns still exist 
about a lack of equivalence in conditions.  
 The quasi-experimental design also made it difficult to assess implicit measures of 
reactions to the news story (though time spent viewing the news story was recorded; no 
significant differences in view time were found based on political identity or type of conflict 
portrayed). Instead, the study relied on self-report measures of moral foundation weights, 
emotions, and perceptions of the moral transgressor’s moral character. As Graham et al. 
(2013) point out, implicit measures of reactions to moral violations are often more accurate 
than explicit measures, especially when people have depleted cognitive resources (e.g., are 
tired, stressed, drunk, etc.). The present study may have only discovered differences 
Democrats and Republicans in self-reported assessments of morality rather than their actual 
reactions to moral violations. Future studies should employ a true experimental design and 
assess implicit reactions to moral violations in narratives. 
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 Additionally, the study employed a volunteer sample through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Research suggests that there are advantages to performing research through MTurk 
over relying on traditional college samples, including increased demographic diversity, with 
no drawbacks to data reliability (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), especially when 
applying filters that allow only participants with the highest approval ratings to participate 
(Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisiti, 2014). The present study did have roughly equal numbers of 
men and women and a high amount of diversity in terms of race, geography, educational 
background, and socioeconomic status. Participants also performed well on the political 
knowledge test. However, concerns remain about the ability to generalize findings beyond 
MTurk workers, who presumably differ from the general population in terms of interest in 
scholarly research. 
 A large imbalance existed between Democrats and Republicans in the sample. 
Responses from Democrats may have been too influential in determining significant 
differences in ratings of a moral violator’s character, interest in, and enjoyment of media. To 
address this issue, analyses were split up based on participants’ political identity where 
relevant, but the low number of Republicans made it harder to detect significant differences 
among conservative participants. The low number of Republicans could point to another 
issue with using participants from MTurk; Republicans appear to be underrepresented on the 
service.  
 The news story manipulation could be another weakness of the study. Especially 
considering the political climate immediately after the study took place (increased coverage 
of the 2016 presidential race, the terrorist attacks by ISIS in Paris, the shooting in San 
Bernadino), the story depicted a relatively tame authority and loyalty violation. It’s possible 
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that a more dramatic or violent violation (e.g., assassination of an ingroup or outgroup 
leader) would have yielded results more in line with MIME’s predictions. Future studies 
should examine news stories depicting moral violations between groups that pose a violent 
threat to each other, much like Bruneau et al., (2012) did in examining Arabs and Israelis.   
 MIME makes predictions about the long-term effects of exposure to media content, 
and the present study did not use a longitudinal design. Based on the current study’s findings, 
it’s possible to speculate about the effects of reactions to moral violations on repeated 
exposure to media content and on reinforcement of existing cognitive structures. However, 
the only way to truly understand the mutually influential relationship among moral 
foundations, group identity, and exposure to media content is through longitudinal research. 
Such research is critical in the current American political landscape. Existing research does 
indicate that prolonged exposure influences both polarization (Stroud, 2010) and weightings 
of moral foundations (Eden et al., 2014). Given apparent differences between liberals and 
conservatives in their innate weights of moral foundations, it’s possible that repeated 
exposure to narratives depicting violations of specific moral foundations could also make 
audience members more rigid in their political beliefs.  
 It is also possible, and perhaps likely, that liberal and conservative media outlets 
emphasize different moral foundations in their coverage of news. Extending the research by 
Bowman et al. (2013), a content analysis could be performed to determine a) the types of 
moral violations covered by liberal, conservative, and mainstream media and b) the different 
foundations emphasized in coverage of the same event. If there are significant differences 
between liberal and conservative news outlets, prolonged exposure to attitude-confirming 
news could reinforce moral foundations as well as political identity.  
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Conclusion 
 The present study extends research on moral foundations theory, MIME, and social 
identity theory by demonstrating the impact of group identity on perceptions of a moral 
transgressor. It is one of the first attempts to examine the MIME model in the context of 
news (rather than fictional) narratives. Group identity appears to play an important, 
antecedent role in assessing morality. Democrats and Republicans both exhibited ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup denigration, especially when seeing ingroup-on-outgroup and 
outgroup-on-ingroup attacks. Given the current climate of political polarization surrounding 
the 2016 presidential election and social issues like gun control, as well as frequent media 
coverage of ideological conflicts between the West and the Middle East, it is imperative that 
researchers come to a better understanding of the role innate moral foundation weights and 
group identity play on exposure to media content. It is also essential that scholars better 
understand the role that prolonged exposure to media content has on reinforcing existing 
foundation weights and group identity. 
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